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Passalacqua: Something's Brewing within the Commercial Speech Doctrine

SOMETHING’S BREWING WITHIN THE
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
Undeniably, each consumer is, to some extent, subconsciously
attentive to advertising.1 Today, one probably cannot open a mailbox,
drive down a street, or visit a favorite website without being ambushed
by a multitude of different advertisements. The vast majority of signs,
flyers, and commercial messages that bombard each person every day
are dismissed as no more than a nuisance. Nevertheless, these
commercial messages, whether they are realized, have a powerful impact
on human behavior and consumption.2 In fact, many people have come
to rely on such advertisements to guide many of their daily decisions.3
While alcohol, tobacco, and gambling play a role in many individuals’
lives, most do not realize the battle being fought by the government and
manufacturers over whether to permit or prohibit the dissemination of
commercial information about these goods and activities to the public.4
For example, in Pitt News and Swecker, state laws that prohibited
advertisements of alcohol in educational publications forced college
newspapers to remove these advertisements from their papers.5 In Pitt
Timothy E. Moore, Subliminal Perception: Facts and Fallacies, S KEPTICAL I NQUIRER,
Spring 1992, at 273, 276. Moore writes:
Extravagant claims notwithstanding, advertising may affect us in
subtle and indirect ways. While there is no scientific evidence for the
existence of “embedded” figures or words, let alone effects from them,
the images and themes contained in advertisements may well
influence viewers’ attitudes and values without their awareness. In
other words, the viewer may be well aware of the stimulus, but not
necessarily aware of the connection between the stimulus and
responses or reactions to it.
Id. at 276.
2
See Terence A. Shimp & Ivan L. Preston, Deceptive and Nondeceptive Consequences of
Evaluative Advertising, 45 J. MKTG. 22, 22–23, 30 (1981) (concluding that more advertisers
today are relying on deceptive, evaluative advertising by using puffery and ambiguous
terms to lure in consumers instead of relying on factual data to support their claims).
3
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976) (“Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what
product . . . at what price. . . . It is a matter of public interest that [private economic]
decisions . . . be intelligent and well informed.”).
4
See Ronald Bayer, Tobacco, Commercial Speech, and Libertarian Values: The End of the Line
for Restrictions on Advertising?, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 356, 356–59 (2002) (using the 1985
congressional debates concerning tobacco use as an example of how many private
associations put pressure on government agencies to enact bans on commercial
advertisements).
5
Compare Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
state statute prohibiting alcohol advertising on collegiate campuses was constitutional),
1
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News v. Pappert, the Third Circuit held that the law banning alcohol
advertisements was unconstitutional because there was no material
evidence supporting the claim that this action would reduce underage
drinking.6 However, in Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech. v. Swecker,
the Fourth Circuit held that the law banning alcohol advertisements was
constitutional because there was a logical connection between alcohol
This outcome is
advertising and increased underage drinking.7
problematic because, in federal courts, like cases should yield identical
results.
Therefore, to clarify the perimeters of advertising in our society, the
U.S. Supreme Court must settle on a concrete First Amendment standard
that governs the commercial speech doctrine. To begin, Part II of this
Note provides a brief treatment of commercial speech under the First
Amendment, followed by an explanation of the test used by the Supreme
Court to interpret commercial speech in regard to the First Amendment
and two different approaches circuit courts have taken in interpreting
this test.8 Second, Part III discusses the positive and negative aspects of
different interpretations of the Central Hudson test.9 Finally, Part IV
explores which interpretations of the Central Hudson test should be
followed and proposes a factors test for courts to use as guidance in
deciding which restrictions on commercial speech should be permitted.10
II. BACKGROUND
For centuries, America has prided itself on protecting individual
liberties.11 A foundation of this core belief is the First Amendment right
with Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a state statute
prohibiting alcohol advertising on collegiate campuses was unconstitutional).
6
379 F.3d at 107.
7
603 F.3d at 590–91.
8
See infra Part II (outlining the creation of the commercial speech doctrine in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy, the test to determine if commercial speech can be restricted in
Central Hudson, and the conflicting standards of the Central Hudson test as interpreted in
Pitt News and Swecker).
9
See infra Part III (articulating the policy reasons supporting and opposing the material
degree and common sense standards in Central Hudson’s third prong and the least
restrictive and reasonable fit standards in Central Hudson’s fourth prong).
10
See infra Part IV (arguing that the Court should adopt the material degree standard for
Central Hudson’s third prong and reaffirm the reasonable fit standard for Central Hudson’s
fourth prong with the addition of a factors test).
11
See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 78 (3d ed. 2002) (stating
that the Fourth Amendment was created to prohibit the English practice of allowing local
officials to forcibly enter a colonist’s home, search it, and smuggle goods out of it, as well as
to have the government honor the dignity of its citizens by issuing warrants before
searches); David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression
in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 798–99 (1985) (explaining that past
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to freedom of speech.12 The First Amendment was enacted to eliminate
all barriers that quieted political speech and to stimulate the unrestricted
transfer of ideas throughout society.13 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has narrowed the construction of the First Amendment by creating
different groups of speech, each of which have their own specific level of
protection.14 However, the Supreme Court has had trouble fitting
commercial speech into any existing First Amendment category and, in
turn, has created multiple contradictory standards for the commercial
speech doctrine.15
Part II.A of this Note examines the protection that commercial
speech has historically received under the First Amendment, the
historians have concluded that the First Amendment gave Americans “remarkable
freedom, which ‘spurred an expanding legacy of liberty’” and was regarded “as a
prerequisite to the republican government”).
12
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 922–23 (3d
ed. 2006) (articulating that the First Amendment was a reaction to the suppression of
speech that existed in England through an elaborate licensing system, seditious libel laws,
and criminal sanctions).
13
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2007)
(stating that the First Amendment was created in order to prohibit the government from
“assessing laws that regulate speech on the basis of content, as well as for scrutinizing
content-based exclusions of speakers from public fora and of the press from criminal
trials”). But see Paul S. Zimmerman, Hanging Up on Commercial Speech: Moser v. FCC, 71
WASH. L. REV. 571, 590 (1996) (arguing that some courts have ignored content-based laws
when the issue before them has concerned commercial speech and that this “selective basis
contains within it a greater possibility for discrimination”).
14
See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (holding that
government speech must only meet rational basis scrutiny to be upheld under the First
Amendment); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (finding that the
expression derived from nude dancing is at the outer limits of the First Amendment and
can be totally banned in public due to its secondary effects); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 558 (1976) (concluding that prior restraints, such as laws restricting publication
and licensing systems, carry a “heavy presumption” against constitutional validity);
Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that a conviction for incitement of
illegal activity is constitutional if there is imminent harm to society, a likelihood that illegal
action will imminently occur, and if the defendant had the intent to cause illegality).
15
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I
continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to
suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in
question may be characterized as ‘commercial.’”); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Since I do not believe we have before us the
wherewithal to declare Central Hudson wrong—or at least the wherewithal to say what
ought to replace it—I must resolve this case in accord with our existing jurisprudence . . . .
[However,] I am not disposed to develop new law, or reinforce old, on this issue, and
accordingly I merely concur in the judgment of the Court.”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
514 U.S. 476, 497–98 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In my opinion, the Government’s
asserted interest, that consumers should be misled or uninformed for their own protection,
does not suffice to justify restrictions on protected speech in any context, whether under
‘exacting scrutiny’ or some other standard.”).
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subsequent landmark cases that created the commercial speech doctrine,
and the construction of the Central Hudson test.16 Next, Part II.B charts
how the Central Hudson test has been applied to diverse classes of
advertising and different mediums by which advertising is
disseminated.17 Subsequently, Part II.B.1 and Part II.B.2 inspect how the
Court has interpreted the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson
test, respectively.18 Part II.C goes on to address the crisis of binge
drinking on collegiate campuses, the types of policies that many
universities have adopted to combat this trend, and the steps the
government has taken to quell this growing societal problem.19 Finally,
Part II.C.1 and Part II.C.2 outline the facts, holdings, and reasonings in
the conflicting decisions Pitt News v. Pappert and Educational Media Co. at
Virginia Tech v. Swecker.20
A. The Evolution of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
The First Amendment expressly states that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”21 Despite the
unambiguous language of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court
refused to recognize commercial speech as a protected form of
expression before 1976.22 Subsequently, however, the Court has held

16
See infra Part II.A (providing a background of the creation and advancement of the
commercial speech doctrine).
17
See infra Part II.B (discussing the various ways the commercial speech doctrine has
been applied since the Central Hudson test was formed).
18
See infra Part II.B.1 and Part II.B.2 (discussing the interpretations of the third and
fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test after 1980).
19
See infra Part II.C (outlining the problems that have occurred as a result of the binge
drinking epidemic on American college campuses and the different avenues taken to curb
this startling pattern).
20
See infra Part II.C.1 and Part II.C.2 (discussing the background on the Third and
Fourth Circuits’ differing opinions on the issue of commercial speech as applied to alcohol
advertisements in collegiate newspapers).
21
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22
See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that states may
constitutionally regulate advertising that is purely commercial); see also Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1951) (finding that state prohibitions on door-to-door
solicitation was constitutional); Ad-Express, Inc. v. Kirvin, 516 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1975)
(holding that a city could ban the distribution of leaflets left on residential doorsteps
because “the Constitution imposes no restraint on government with respect to purely
commercial advertising in the public streets”); Stevenson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Tex., 393 F. Supp. 812, 819 (W.D. Tex. 1975) (concluding that a graduate student’s speech in
a television commercial was not protected because his representations concerning the
device were neither “scientific [nor] educational [in] nature”); Thomas H. Jackson & John
Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1979) (stating that commercial speech is recognized as less protected under the
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that the First Amendment protects not only the right to free expression,
but the “right to ‘receive information and ideas.’”23 In the commercial
context, the Court advanced this theory in the landmark case Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.24 In that
case, the Court held that pharmacists could advertise their prescription
prices in newspapers, despite the government’s substantial interest in
upholding the professional standards and ethics of the pharmaceutical
industry.25 This decision was founded on the right of consumers to
receive truthful information about products in the “marketplace of
ideas.”26
First Amendment because courts have made a “distinction between the market for ideas
and the market for goods and services”).
23
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757
(1976) (holding that pharmacists have the constitutional right to advertise prices in
newspapers); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972) (stating the “First
Amendment right to ‘receive information and ideas’”); see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809, 822 (1975) (holding that an abortion advertisement published in a newspaper was
protected speech under the First Amendment because it did more than propose a
commercial transaction, “[i]t contained factual material of clear ‘public interest’” that was
of “value to a diverse audience—not only to readers possibly in need of the services
offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject
matter”). But see Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech
and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L.
REV. 555, 583 (2006) (arguing that commercial speech is a qualified right because the
doctrine was built around the idea that consumers have the right to hear a commercial
message and that commercial speakers lack strong independent constitutional interests).
24
425 U.S. at 773. “[A] [s]tate may [not] completely suppress the dissemination of
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s
effect upon its disseminators and its recipients.” Id.
25
Id. at 770. The Court held “that high professional standards . . . are guaranteed by the
close regulation to which pharmacists in Virginia are subject. . . . Surely, any pharmacist
guilty of professional dereliction that actually endangers his customer will promptly lose
his license.” Id. at 768–69.
26
Id. at 770. The Court explained “that people will perceive their own best interests if
only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to [achieving] that end is to
open the channels of communication rather than to close them.” Id. Further, the Court
stated that “[a]dvertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what
product . . . at what price. . . . It is a matter of public interest that [private economic]
decisions . . . be intelligent and well informed.” Id. at 765. Therefore, the Court noted that
“the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.” Id. Some Justices support the
protection of commercial speech in the marketplace because “[i]f the individual is to
achieve the maximum degree of material satisfaction permitted by his resources, he must
be presented with as much information as possible concerning the relative merits of
competing products.” Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 433 (1971).
This is because “advertising serves a legitimate educational function in that it is ‘an
immensely powerful instrument for the elimination of ignorance . . . .’” Id. Moreover, the
marketplace of ideas theory, which holds, “the best test of truth is the power of the thought
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Likewise, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court held that a blanket
suppression of advertisements providing prices for legal services was
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.27 More importantly, the
Court carved out three critical exceptions to the dissemination of
commercial speech under the First Amendment. First, commercial
statements are unprotected if they are false or can be construed to
mislead or deceive recipients of the message.28 Second, legislatures may
enact laws that restrict the time, place, and manner of commercial
speech.29 Lastly, commercial speech advertising illegal activity is
unprotected.30
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission of New
York, the Court attempted to deviate from a case-by-case analysis of the
newly minted commercial speech doctrine by creating a structured test
to examine commercial speech.31 In Central Hudson, the New York Public
Service Commission ordered Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation
to stop all advertising that promoted the use of electricity.32 The Public

to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out,” supports the protection of consumers’
rights. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
27
433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). “[T]he flow of such information may not be restrained,
and . . . the disciplinary rule against appellants [is] violative of the First Amendment.” Id.
28
See id. at 383 (“Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to
restraint.”); see also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15–16 (1979) (holding that a law
restricting optometrists from associating their names with any optometrical office they did
not work at was constitutional because there was a significant possibility that names of the
optometrists on the offices would be used to mislead the public); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 464–65 (1978) (holding that attorneys do not have a constitutional right
to personally solicit victims of accidents in the hospital because “the very plight of that
person not only makes him more vulnerable to influence [like that of a lawyer] but also
may make advice all the more intrusive”).
29
See Bates, 433 U.S. at 384 (holding that “reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and
manner of [commercial] advertising” are acceptable).
30
See id. (holding that illegal advertisements may be suppressed); see also Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (concluding
that a newspaper could not publish want ads for employers that sexually discriminated in
the job description because a city ordinance prohibited any employer from publishing or
causing to be published any advertisement indicating sex discrimination).
31
See Shannon M. Hinegardner, Note, Abrogating the Supreme Court’s De Facto Rational
Basis Standard for Commercial Speech: A Survey and Proposed Revision of the Third Central
Hudson Prong, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 523, 533 (2009) (suggesting that the Court failed to
create a concrete test to evaluate commercial speech cases before Central Hudson); see also
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 629–
30 (1990) (expressing that the Court could not decide what level of scrutiny to apply to
cases involving the commercial speech doctrine—let alone the elements for a rigid test—in
the interim between Bates and Central Hudson).
32
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 558–59
(1980).
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Service Commission issued this instruction to protect the best interests of
the public by promoting the conservation of energy and to minimize the
chances that the public would incur higher rates.33
The Court began its analysis by defining commercial speech as
expression that is solely related to the economic interest of the speaker.34
By examining prior case law, the Court created a four-pronged test that
could be applied to cases concerning the right to free speech in the
commercial context. First, the expression being restricted must be
protected by the First Amendment.35 Second, the government’s interest
must be substantial.36 Third, the restriction on speech must directly
advance the interest that the government asserted.37 Lastly, the
restriction on speech must not be more extensive than necessary to serve
the government’s substantial interests.38
In applying this test to the Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corporation, the Court held that the first and second prongs were
satisfied.39 Furthermore, the government met the third prong because
33
Id. at 559. The Court found that the Public Service Commission of New York
“declared all promotional advertising [of energy] contrary to the national policy of
conserving energy,” and that the Public Service Commission deemed Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corporation’s advertising scheme to be promotional; which was advertising
targeted at stimulating the purchase of utility services. Id. Further, the Public Service
Commission of New York argued that the promotional advertising could raise the cost of
utilities’ prices because the rates on electricity were not based on marginal costs. Id. at 568–
69. Therefore, if electricity consumption increased during peak hours, the rates would not
reflect the true costs of expanding production of the electricity. Id. Moreover, these extra
costs would be paid by the consumer, not Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation. Id.
at 569.
34
See id. at 579 (“[C]ommercial speech [is] ‘expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience.’”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1529 (9th ed.
2009) (defining commercial speech as “[c]ommunication (such as advertising and
marketing) that involves only the commercial interests of the speaker and the audience,
and is therefore afforded lesser First Amendment protection than social, political, or
religious speech”). But see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983)
(holding that whether or not speech is determined to be commercial is figured by weighing
the following factors: (1) whether the speaker proposes a commercial transaction; (2)
whether the speaker concedes that the speech is an advertisement; (3) whether the speaker
references a specific product; and (4) whether the speaker has an economic motivation).
35
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The Court stated that, “[f]or commercial speech to come
within [the First Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading.” Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 566–69. In regard to the first prong, the Court held that “[i]n the absence of
factors that would distort the decision to advertise, [the Court] may assume that the
willingness of a business to promote its products reflects a belief that consumers are
interested in the advertising.” Id. at 567–68. The Court reasoned that, since consumers
may need to know information to aid their decision to use a product, or how much of the
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energy conservation could be directly advanced by the restriction on
advertising.40 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the government’s
restriction was more extensive than necessary to further the state’s
interest in energy conservation, and therefore struck down the Public
Service Commission’s order prohibiting promotional advertising.41
Following the Court’s decision in Central Hudson, the four-pronged test
has been adapted to various other instances of commercial speech.42
B. The Subsequent Expansion and Interpretation of the Central Hudson Test
In the aftermath of Central Hudson, the Court has since attempted to
define the contours of the commercial speech doctrine by applying the
four-pronged test to limitations imposed on controversial
advertisements of: (1) alcohol products;43 (2) tobacco products;44 (3)

product, the advertising in this case was constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 567–72.
The Court held that the states had two valid interests to protect in this case. Id. First, the
state’s goal in conserving energy was substantial because “[i]n view of our country’s
dependence on energy resources beyond our control, no one can doubt the importance of
energy conservation.” Id. at 568. Further, the state had a second substantial interest in
keeping rates fair and efficient. Id. at 569.
40
Id. at 569. The Court held that the state’s interest in conserving energy was directly
advanced by the restriction on promotional advertising because the increased advertising
for electrical services would presumably lead to increased consumption of electricity. Id.
In rejecting the state’s argument, the Court held the assertion that the impact of
promotional advertising would unfairly increase public rates was “tenuous” and “highly
speculative.” Id.
41
Id. at 570. The Court held that the Commission’s order was overbroad because it
prevented utility companies from promoting energy services that would reduce electricity.
Id. Further, the Court concluded that the Commission could have alternatively required all
utility service advertisements to contain efficiency and expense information within them,
instead of totally banning all speech disseminated by utility companies to consumers. Id.
42
See infra Part II.B (detailing the use of the Central Hudson test in various cases
concerning other products and services as well as in commercial speech cases pertaining to
specific mediums).
43
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489–90, 516 (1996) (holding that a
state may not prohibit manufacturers, wholesalers, shippers, or retailers from advertising
the price of alcoholic beverages; or completely disallow any newspaper, periodical, radio or
television broadcaster from accepting, publishing, or broadcasting any advertisements for
alcoholic beverages); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995) (finding that
it is unconstitutional for the government to prevent brewers of beer from labeling the
alcohol content on their product’s packaging, even though states have substantial interests
in reducing alcohol consumption).
44
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 534–35, 571 (2001) (holding that a
state regulation prohibiting all outdoor tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet of any public
playground, playground area in a public park, elementary school, or secondary school, and
all point-of-sale advertising lower than five feet from the floor was unconstitutional
because it prohibited protected speech from being heard by adults, even though the state
had a substantial interest in preventing minors from using tobacco products).
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gambling;45 (4) professional services;46 and (5) health care services.47
Moreover, the Court has decided cases concerning the limitations on
commercial advertisement delivered through mediums such as: (1)
signs;48 (2) billboards;49 (3) books; (4) magazines; (5) newspapers;50 (6)

45
See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195–96 (1999)
(concluding that a federal statute was unconstitutional as applied when it prohibited
commercial advertising for private casinos in states where gambling was legalized); United
States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 435–36 (1993) (finding that Congress may
constitutionally prohibit radio stations in non-gambling states from broadcasting lottery
advertisements even if most of their listeners reside in pro-gambling states).
46
See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (holding that a state’s thirtyday ban on legal direct-mail solicitations to accident victims was constitutional because this
policy limited the intrusion into the victims’ privacy and allowed the state to craft the
standards of state-licensed lawyers); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l. Regulation, Bd. of
Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 149 (1994) (finding that a state unconstitutionally imposed
sanctions on an attorney for advertising as a certified public accountant, when the attorney
was licensed under state law as an accountant); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993)
(concluding that a state’s ban on direct, in-person, uninvited solicitations by certified public
accountants was unconstitutional); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of
Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 110–11 (1990) (holding that an attorney who advertised that his services
were certified by the National Board of Trial Advocacy was protected by the First
Amendment); In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 207 (1982) (finding that the provisions of a state
supreme court rule regulating lawyer advertising that prohibited lawyers from identifying
the jurisdictions in which the lawyer was licensed to practice violated the First
Amendment).
47
See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002) (finding that a federal
regulation prohibiting advertising and promotion of particular compounded drugs was
unconstitutional); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 80 (1983) (holding that
a law that prohibited sending unsolicited information concerning contraceptives through
the mail was unconstitutional under the First Amendment); see also Carey v. Population
Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 678–82, 700–01 (1977) (concluding that a state law that banned the
advertising and display of contraceptives was unconstitutional under the First Amendment
when applied to a direct-mail, non-medical contraceptive devices company); Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–73 (1976) (finding
that a state law restricting pharmacists from advertising prices of pharmaceutical
medication was unconstitutional).
48
See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 86, 97 (1977) (holding
that a township ordinance banning “For Sale” or “Sold” signs was unconstitutional).
49
See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981) (concluding that
the First Amendment protects the communicative and expressive aspects of billboards, just
like any other medium of communication that combines communicative and noncommunicative features).
50
See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429–31 (1993) (holding
that a city’s revocation of a permit to place newsracks dispensing the plaintiff’s free
magazines, which consisted primarily of advertisements for services, was unconstitutional
because the city did not have a reasonable fit between its interests of improving aesthetics
and safety and the restriction of commercial handbills); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985) (concluding that commercial
illustrations in newspapers are entitled to the same First Amendment protections given to
verbal speech).
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mail;51 (7) radio and oral communications;52 and (8) television
broadcasting.53 However, while expanding this doctrine, the Court has
employed numerous standards to interpret the Central Hudson test, and,
in turn, this approach has created uncertainty over how the First
Amendment should be applied to commercial speech cases.54
1.

The Court’s Interpretation of Central Hudson’s Third Prong

The third prong of the Central Hudson test requires that a restriction
on commercial speech must directly advance the substantial interest the
government asserts.55 To directly advance the government’s substantial
interest, the government has the burden of proving that the law
restricting speech materially mitigates a cited injury to the public.56
Although the government can use broad evidentiary sources to prove its
interest is advanced, the government may not satisfy this prong by

51
See Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 635 (holding that a state’s thirty-day ban on legal direct-mail
solicitations to accident victims was constitutional because this policy limited the intrusion
into victims’ privacy and allowed the state to craft the standards of state-licensed lawyers);
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 79–80 (holding that a law that prohibited sending unsolicited information
concerning contraceptives through the mail was unconstitutional under the First
Amendment); Carey, 431 U.S. at 678, 700 (holding that a state law that banned the
advertising and display of contraceptives was unconstitutional under the First Amendment
when applied to a direct-mail, non-medical contraceptive devices company).
52
See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 720, 732–33 (1990) (holding that it was
reasonable to restrict the access to postal premises for purposes of solicitation when an
organization asked for contributions, sold books and subscriptions to the organization’s
newspaper, and distributed literature on a variety of political issues because the solicitation
was inherently disruptive of the postal service’s business); Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 469, 485–86 (1989) (reversing and remanding an appellate court
decision upholding a state school rule prohibiting private commercial enterprises from
operating in public university facilities).
53
See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 173, 195–96
(1999) (holding that a federal statute was unconstitutional as applied when it prohibited
radio and television commercial advertising for private casinos in states where gambling
was legalized). But see United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 435–36 (1993)
(finding that Congress may constitutionally prohibit radio stations in a non-gambling state
from broadcasting lottery advertisements, even if most of their listeners reside in a progambling state).
54
See infra Part II.B.1 and II.B.2 (describing the use of the material degree and common
sense standards for the third prong of the Central Hudson test and the establishment of the
least restrictive means and reasonable fit standards in regard to the fourth prong).
55
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
56
See Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 626 (holding that the state has the burden of proof to show that
commercial speech is actually harmful); see also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569 (suggesting
that speculative evidence is not enough to satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson
test).
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relying on mere speculation or conjecture.57 Further, the law will not be
upheld if it provides insufficient support for the government’s purpose,58
or if there is little chance that the law can advance the government’s
interest.59
In attempting to define the evidentiary threshold necessary to
comply with Central Hudson’s third prong, the Court held in Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly that the government may authorize speech
restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and simple common
sense.60 Additionally, in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., the Court stated
57
See Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 626, 628 (holding that the government did not satisfy its
evidentiary burden because it “[did] not disclose any anecdotal evidence . . . that
validate[d] the [government’s] suppositions” and that the Court would not read prior “case
law to require that empirical data come to [the Court] accompanied by [excessive]
background information” (alterations in original)); Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Free
Speech, Fleeting Expletives, and the Causation Quagmire: Was Justice Scalia Wrong in Fox
Television Stations?, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 737, 773 (2010) (suggesting that empirical
evidence must be coupled with moral and social concerns to properly adjudicate issues
arising under the third prong of the Central Hudson test).
58
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993).
59
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 566 (2001).
60
See id. at 555 (expressing that history, consensus, and simple common sense was
sufficient evidence to justify strict scrutiny in prior strict scrutiny cases); see also Fla. Bar, 515
U.S. at 628 (suggesting history, consensus, and simple common sense would satisfy the
intermediate scrutiny standard set forth in the Central Hudson test); Alexander v. Cahill, 598
F.3d 79, 92–94 (2d Cir. 2010) (advocating for the strong view of the common sense
standard); Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 589–90 (4th Cir. 2010) (using the
logical nexus approach to the common sense standard to conclude that alcohol advertising
causes an increase in binge drinking); WV Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v.
Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 303, 305 (4th Cir. 2009) (applying the logical nexus approach to the
common sense standard to hold that video advertising at casinos may cause gambling
addicts to compulsively spend money); IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 57–59 (1st
Cir. 2008) (adopting the legislative deference view to the simple common sense standard);
Pagan v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766, 777 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the strong common sense
standard is the appropriate approach); G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d
1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting the legislative deference standard to hold that
legislative deliberation, a dynamic dialogue with the city’s residents and businesses,
extensive hearings, and a city council’s reliance on the experience of other cities were
sufficient evidence to institute a commercial sign restriction on certain sizes, types, and
designs of signs on city roads); Pac. Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 1221, 1235
(10th Cir. 2005) (supporting the strong view approach in applying the common sense
standard to invalidate a city’s ordinance establishing a solicitor’s licensing procedure
because it violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment commercial speech rights); Missouri ex
rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 654–55 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
legislative deference standard was the correct interpretation of the common sense
standard, and proving that legislative findings showed that prohibitions on unsolicited
commercial fax advertisements directly and materially advanced the government’s
asserted interest); Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 957 (11th Cir. 2000) (expressing that the
strong view approach to the common sense standard was correct and that “the Supreme
Court has not accepted ‘common sense’ alone to prove the existence of a concrete, non-
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that references to studies and personal accounts of particular incidents
could potentially meet the government’s burden of proof.61 The
government has even been given the power to combine reports and
anecdotes from different locales to justify the government’s interest.62
Like Central Hudson’s third prong, the fourth prong of the analysis has
also been subject to multiple interpretations.63
2.

The Court’s Interpretation of Central Hudson’s Fourth Prong

Initially, the Court declared that the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test requires that a restriction on commercial speech be no more
extensive than necessary to serve the government’s substantial
interests.64 The Court has redefined this standard to mean that the
government restriction must be accomplished by the least restrictive
means possible.65 Currently, however, the Court has stated that
speculative harm”); Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and
Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 132 (2003) (arguing that conflicting empirical data
can hinder courts from deciding cases consistently).
61
515 U.S. at 624. The Florida Bar Court referenced City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters,
Inc., which held that a city could justify zoning ordinances that required adult movie
theaters to be 1,000 feet away from schools, parks, and churches in order “to prevent crime,
protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, and generally ‘protec[t] and
preserv[e] the quality of [the city’s] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of
urban life.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41, 46, 48 (1986)). In Renton, the Court held that, rather than conduct its own
study, the city of Renton could base its substantial interest in reducing crime, protecting
trade, and preserving property values to rezone an adult theater by referencing a twentyyear-old study created by the city of Detroit. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50–51. The Court has also
held that empirical evidence does not have to necessarily be obtained to win a free speech
case. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812–13 (2009).
62
Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 628.
63
See infra Part II.B.2 (demonstrating that the Court has used both the least restrictive
means standard and the reasonable fit standard to adjudicate the fourth prong of the
Central Hudson test).
64
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (stating that, for the fourth prong, the Court will ask if the restriction on commercial
speech “is not more extensive than is necessary to serve [the government’s] interest”); see
also Andrew L. Howell, Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.: What Scrutiny Should be
Applied to Government Regulations on Truthful Commercial Speech?, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1089,
1094 (1994) (stating that the no more than necessary standard currently “lies somewhere
between a ‘rational basis’ test and a ‘least restrictive means’ test”).
65
See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996) (holding that a pricing ban
on all alcohol advertising was unconstitutional since “alternative forms of regulation that
would not involve any restrictions on speech [such as the maintenance of higher price, the
rationing of per capita purchases, or the use of educational campaigns focused on drinking
problems] would be more likely to achieve the [s]tate’s goal of promoting temperance”);
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (“The FAAA’s defects are further
highlighted by the availability of alternatives that would prove less intrusive to the First
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prohibitions on commercial speech do not have to be achieved by the
least restrictive means possible.66 For example, in Board of Trustees v. Fox,
the Court declared that a state may not prohibit commercial speech by
purporting to have a mere rational basis.67 Rather, the government must
demonstrate that there is a fit between the legislature’s ends and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends.68 This fit does not need to be
perfect, nor does it necessarily have to represent the single least
restrictive means taken to achieve that end.69 Thus, as expressed in
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States, restrictions must
be narrowly drawn to regulate speech only to the extent that the
restriction would further the state’s substantial objective.70 A good
example of the tension between competing interpretations of the Central

Amendment’s protections for commercial speech.” (emphasis added)); see also Eugene
Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1134 (2005) (arguing that the least
restrictive means test will be met if it is an unavoidable side-effect of the restriction of
harmful speech).
66
See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479 (1989) (“[O]ur [past]
decisions upholding the regulation of commercial speech cannot be reconciled with a
requirement of least restrictive means.”); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R.,
478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (“The last two steps of the Central Hudson analysis basically involve
a consideration of the ‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to
accomplish those ends.”).
67
492 U.S. at 479. Justice Blackman observed that:
None of our cases invalidating the regulation of commercial speech
involved a provision that went only marginally beyond what would
adequately have served the governmental interest. . . . [A]lmost all of
the restrictions disallowed under Central Hudson’s fourth prong have
been substantially excessive, disregarding “far less restrictive and
more precise means.”
Id.; see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418 n.13 (1993)
(explaining that “we rejected mere rational-basis review” for judging restrictions on
commercial speech). But see Hinegardner, supra note 31, at 529–30 (“[T]he ‘common sense’
rationale . . . [automatically] creates a de facto rational basis standard because ‘common
sense’ provides absolutely no basis for the judiciary to review legislative decisions.”).
68
See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341 (stating that the reasonable fit test was to be applied to the
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test).
69
See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (“[A] fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that
represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion
to the interest served,’ that employs . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective.” (citation omitted)).
70
527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999). The Court held that:
The Government is not required to employ the least restrictive means
conceivable, but it must demonstrate narrow tailoring of the
challenged regulation to the asserted interest—“a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the
interest served.”
Id.
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Hudson test can be seen in Pitt News v. Pappert and Educational Media Co.
at Virginia Tech v. Swecker.
C. The Pitt News v. Pappert and Educational Media Co. v. Swecker
Decisions
Before Pitt News and Swecker, a battle was brewing over binge
drinking on college campuses.71 Within the past decade, several colleges
throughout the United States have attempted to reign in student binge
drinking following several incidents resulting in death,72 sexual abuse,73
See NIAAA Council Approves Definition of Binge Drinking, NAT’L INST. ALCOHOL ABUSE
& ALCOHOLISM NEWSLETTER (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs./Nat’l Inst. of Health,
Rockville, Md.), Winter 2004, at 3, available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/
Newsletter/winter2004/Newsletter_Number3.pdf (explaining that binge drinking is
defined as a pattern of drinking that brings a person’s blood alcohol content to a level of
0.08% or more within two hours). Binge drinking typically occurs when adult men
consume five or more drinks, or adult women consume four or more drinks, in about two
hours and that drink is defined as one twelve-ounce beer, one five-ounce glass of wine, or
one 1.5-ounce shot of distilled spirits. Id.; see also William DeJong, The Role of Mass Media
Campaigns in Reducing High-Risk Drinking among College Students, J. STUD. ALCOHOL, supp.
no. 14, 2002 at 182, 183–85 (reviewing the informational advertising campaigns, social norm
marketing campaigns, and advocacy campaigns that colleges utilize to reduce alcohol
consumption and awareness through advertisements in newspapers, television, radio, and
other mediums); Henry Wechsler, Jae Eun Lee, Meichun Kuo & Hang Lee, College Binge
Drinking in the 1990s: A Continuing Problem, 48 J. AM. C. HEALTH 199, 200, 202–03 (2000)
(reporting that a survey, which included 119 colleges throughout the United States and
more than 14,000 students, revealed that approximately two out of every five students
(44%) were binge drinkers, 19% were abstainers, and 23% were frequent binge drinkers in
1999); Evan Thomas, How to Fight Binge Drinking: Would Lowering the Legal Age Help Colleges
Curb Alcohol Abuse?, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.newsweek.com/2008/09/
10/how-to-fight-binge-drinking.html (reporting that 150 college presidents signed a letter
to change the drinking age to eighteen so that minors are not as tempted to drink heavily).
72
See Robert Davis, Five Binge-Drinking Deaths ‘Just the Tip of the Iceberg’, USA TODAY
(Oct. 7, 2004), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-10-07-binge-usat_x.htm
(reporting that five college student deaths had been linked to binge drinking in the first
two months of the 2004 school year nationwide); Carey Goldberg, A Drinking Death Rattles
Elite M.I.T.; Latest Fraternity Party Case Underscores Nationwide Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1997, at A12 (reporting on the tragic death of a MIT freshman linked to binge drinking
during a fraternity hazing ceremony); Ronald Smothers, Freshman’s Drinking Death Stuns a
New Jersey University, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007, at B2 (discussing the death of an eighteenyear-old college student due to excessive alcohol consumption at a fraternity party at Rider
University).
73
Meichun Mohler-Kuo, George W. Dowdall, Mary P. Koss & Henry Wechsler,
Correlates of Rape while Intoxicated in a National Sample of College Women, J. STUD. ALCOHOL,
Jan. 2004, at 37, available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/cas/Documents/rapeintox/
037-Mohler-Kuo.sep1.pdf. This study was conducted by the Department of Society,
Human Development and Health, Harvard School of Public Health. Id. The researchers
conducted evaluations at 119 schools and used a sample size of 215 randomly selected
students at each school. Id. at 38. The study concluded that there is a strong correlation
between rape and alcohol. Id. at 43. Specifically, roughly one in twenty college women
71
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and violent riots.74 These have prompted universities to create a wide
range of alcohol policies including: (1) three strike rules;75 (2) zerotolerance regulations;76 (3) parental notification;77 and (4) alcohol
advertising bans.78

experienced rape; and intoxication increased a woman’s risk of being raped. Id. at 42.
Among those who experienced rape since the beginning of the school year, 72% of these
women were so intoxicated that they were unable to consent. Id.
74
See Pat Borzi, On College Football Game Days, Efforts to Deter Binge Drinking, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/sports/ncaafootball/19drunk.html?
_r=1 (reporting on the University of Minnesota’s new drinking policy mandating
breathalyzer testing for all student football season ticket holders who have been ejected
from a game, which was instituted because of extensive property damage and numerous
arrests that occurred during past rioting on the campus in which excessive drinking was
cited as a factor in the unruly behavior); Jenna Johnson, Crowded Off-Campus Party
Degenerates into ‘War Zone’, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/12/AR2010041204291.html?hpid=topnews
(reporting
on an 8,000-person James Madison University Springfest party that turned into a riot after
partygoers shattered car and house windows as well as threw rocks, beer bottles, and cans,
injuring dozens of people).
75
UNIV. OF R.I., STUDENT HANDBOOK, § 2.34, Minimum Mandatory Sanctions for Alcohol
and Other Drug Violations: Individual Students (2010), available at http://www.uri.edu/
judicial/assets/URI_Student_Handbook_2008-2010.pdf. The University of Rhode Island’s
alcohol policy states:
Any student under the age of 21 who consumes and/or possesses
alcohol in violation of Rhode Island law will be sanctioned as
follows[:] . . .
[F]irst offense, the mandatory minimum sanction will be completion
of a self-assessment survey . . . and a minimum fine of $50. . . .
[T]he second offense, within [three] semesters, the mandatory
minimum sanction will be mandatory education and evaluation and a
minimum fine of $100. . . .
[T]he third offense within three semesters [of the first offense], the
mandatory minimum sanction will be suspension from the [u]niversity
for two semesters with readmission possible on presentation of proof
of treatment.
Id.
76
UNIV. OF COLO., STUDENT CONDUCT STUDENT CONDUCT CODE POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES, § 24, Possessing, using, providing, manufacturing, distributing, or selling alcoholic
beverages in violation of law or university policies (2010―2011), available at
http://www.colorado.edu/studentaffairs/studentconduct/downloads/StudentConduct
PoliciesandProcedures.pdf. The University of Colorado’s alcohol policy states that it
applies to “an underage student . . . who knew, or reasonably should have known, s/he
was in the presence of alcoholic beverages, or possessed, displayed, or was in the presence
of an alcohol container or containers” and that “[i]n the case of a student who is found
responsible via the student conduct process to have endangered the health, safety, or
welfare of an individual through the provision of alcohol, the minimum disciplinary
sanction shall be suspension.” Id.; see also Drug and Alcohol Policy, TEX. LUTHERAN UNIV.
(2010), http://www.tlu.edu/podium/default.aspx?t=6648&tn=Drug+and+Alcohol+Policy
&lid=33689&ptid=129339&pttid=2&sdb=1 (citing the Texas Lutheran University alcohol
policy, which states that “[t]he university will impose a minimum disciplinary penalty of
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Nevertheless, many reporters and scholars have criticized the
ineffectiveness of these collegiate alcohol policies as well as the methods
used to enforce them.79 In response to the alleged failure of these alcohol
polices, many cities and states have enacted ordinances, regulations, and
statutes, some of which are related to alcohol advertising.80 Currently,
suspension for a specified period of time or suspension of rights and privileges, or both, for
conduct related to the use, possession, or distribution of drugs that are prohibited by law”).
77
UNIV. OF MO., COLLECTED RULES AND REGULATIONS, 180.025, Parental Notification of
Alcohol and Controlled Substances Violations (2010). The University of Missouri’s alcohol
policy states:
The [u]niversity may notify only parent(s) or legal guardian(s) who
have not declined to participate in the parental notification program
under the following conditions: (a) if the student is under 21 years of
age at the time of disclosure; and (b) when the student has been
determined under the Rules of Procedures in Student Conduct
Matters, § 200.020 of the Collected Rules and Regulations of the
University of Missouri to have violated the student conduct code
concerning alcohol or controlled substances on campus including
operating a vehicle . . . under the influence of alcohol . . . as prohibited
by law of the state of Missouri as stated in § 200.010 B.8; and (c) the
violation is an initial severe, second or a subsequent violation of the
student conduct code concerning alcohol or controlled substances. An
initial severe offense is one that . . . endangers self, or others, or that
may result in the potential loss of campus housing privileges, or have
an impact on student status. (d) the University reserves the right not
to notify parent(s) or legal guardian(s) even though the above
conditions are satisfied, upon the written recommendation of a health
care provider who determines that such notification would not be in
the best interest of the student and would be detrimental to the
student’s health, safety or welfare.
Id.
78
See Vivian B. Faden & Marcy L. Baskin, An Evaluation of College Online Alcohol-Policy
Information, 51(3) J. AM. C. HEALTH 101, 104 (2002), available at http://www.collegedrinking
prevention.gov/CollegePresidents/evalCollegeAlcoholPolicies.aspx (stating that twentynine of the top fifty-two ranked universities in the nation had some kind of advertising
restrictions that promoted an anti-alcohol policy and nineteen specifically prohibited
advertisements from mentioning alcohol).
79
See David J. Hanson, Effective and Ineffective College Alcohol Policies, ALCOHOL
PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS, http://www2.potsdam.edu/hansondj/youthissues/1131472758.
html (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (criticizing universities’ “‘tough on drinking’” policies that
ban all beer sales and punish non-drinkers caught at parties where alcohol is present); Tara
Parker-Pope, Party Colleges Do Little to Curb Drinking, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2009),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/colleges-do-little-to-curb-drinking/?scp=9&
sq=alcohol%20fight%20college&st=cse (stating that college alcohol policies focus on
alcohol education programs but ought to educate students about how their drinking habits
compare to those of other students and to show them that regular excessive drinking is not
the norm).
80
See David C. Newman, Wellesley Zero-Tolerance Alcohol Policy May Be Ineffective, HARV.
CRIMSON (Dec. 1, 1999), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1999/12/1/wellesley-zerotolerance-alcohol-policy-may-be/ (criticizing a city ordinance that permits police officers to
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only two states have statutes aimed at reducing alcohol products from
being advertised in conjunction with education-related activities.81
However, several states have promulgated regulations that prohibit or
restrict advertisements that encourage the use, sale, consumption, or
distribution of alcohol in the educational setting.82 These state statutes
issue a summons to underage drinkers for their first offense); Social Host Ordinance Produces
Unintended Consequences, DAILY NEXUS (June 3, 2010), http://www.dailynexus.com/201006-03/social-host-ordinance-produces-unintended-consequences/ (stating that the city of
Isla Vista’s new ordinance lacks clear guidelines to prevent the law from being unduly
directed at the Isla Vista community and will primarily affect UCSB and SBCC students);
see also David Vladeck, Gerald Weber & Lawrence O. Gostin, Commercial Speech and the
Public’s Health: Regulating Advertisements of Tobacco, Alcohol, High Fat Foods and Other
Potentially Hazardous Products, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 32, 32 (2004) (acknowledging that
many laws that ban advertising for products that diminish public health stem from
legislators’ beliefs that advertisers’ inherent advantages in funding and control over the
message drown out competing public health statements).
81
See 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-498(e)(3) (West 2003) (effective Feb. 7, 2003)
(prohibiting print advertisements of alcoholic beverages within three hundred feet of any
church, school, or public playground); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-2109(e) (West 2009)
(effective July 1, 2009) (permitting advertising on the rear of school buses but expressly
prohibiting any alcohol or tobacco advertisements).
82
See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6C1-2.003(2)(b) (2010) (prohibiting advertisements for
the use, sale, consumption, or distribution of alcohol including: (1) two-for-one specials; (2)
beat-the-clock deals; (3) happy hours; (4) lady’s night; or (5) illustrations or photos
depicting these activities at the University of Florida); 905 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-38-2 (2010)
(prohibiting a primary supplier, wholesaler, or salesman of alcoholic beverages or the
holder of a retailer’s or dealer’s permit to sell alcoholic beverages from erecting or
maintaining any sign advertising alcoholic beverages within two hundred feet of a church
or school); 4 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2S.1006(c) (2010) (banning alcoholic beverage advertising
in any programs for events or activities in connection with any elementary or secondary
schools and prohibiting any alcoholic beverages advertising connected with these events
when broadcast over radio or television); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4301:1-1-44(D)(1) (2010)
(forbidding billboard advertisements within five hundred feet of any church, school, or
public playground); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 81-1-17(2)(j)(iv) (2010) (prohibiting alcohol
advertisements directed at or appealing primarily to minors by placing advertising in any
school, college or university magazine, newspaper, program, television program, radio
program, or other media, or sponsoring any school, college, or university activity); 3 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-40(2)(2010) (prohibiting advertisements of alcoholic beverages in
college student publications unless in reference to a dining establishment); WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 314-52-070 (2010) (prohibiting outdoor advertising of liquor placed within five
hundred feet of schools where the administrative body of these schools object to such
placement, or any place which the Liquor Control Board, in its discretion, finds contrary to
the public interest); W. VA. CODE R. § 126-23-3 (2010) (prohibiting all alcohol and tobacco
advertisements on any school property). But see MICH. ADMIN CODE r. 436.1861 (2010)
(permitting brewers, vendors of spirits, wine makers, out-of-state sellers of beer and wine,
and licensed wholesalers of beer or wine to advertise in any newspaper or periodical
published or circulated on the campus of a two- or four-year college or university located
in the state); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0100-03-.03 (2010) (limiting advertising of distilled
spirits and wines to brand names and only by direct mail and/or email; and narrowing
advertising of distilled spirits, wines, and alcoholic beverages to newsletters, catalogues, or
similar communications).
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and local regulations have led to litigation and conflicting opinions in
many jurisdictions.83
1.

The Pitt News Opinion

Pitt News is an independent, student-run newspaper at the
University of Pittsburgh that is published daily during the school year
and weekly during the summer.84 The publication is distributed free of
charge to students and staff at over seventy-five locations around the
university’s campus.85 The paper is governed by a student publications
board, which selects an editor-in-chief, who has final editorial control
over any content in the paper.86 The publication follows a fifty-fifty
formula, whereby half of the paper is devoted to news content and the
other half to advertisements.87
In 1996, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted an amendment to the
state Liquor Code known as Act 199.88 The Act prohibited all alcohol
advertisements that were in any way linked to an educational institution
or directed at minors.89 The Act banned advertisements in almost all
83
Compare Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
state statute prohibiting alcohol advertising on collegiate campuses was constitutional),
with Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a state statute
prohibiting alcohol advertising on collegiate campuses was unconstitutional).
84
Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 101. The Pitt News is a student-run publication, created by the
University Board of Trustees, which represents the independent speech of students, and is
not an official publication disseminated on behalf of the public university. Id.
85
Id. In fall 1997, the University of Pittsburgh had 25,461 students on its campus and
employed 7,742 faculty members and staff. Brief of Appellant at 6, Pitt News v. Pappert,
379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1725), 2003 WL 24302476. At that time, over seventy-five
percent of the university’s population was over the age of twenty-one. Id. Many local
people outside of the university were also readers of the publication. Id.
86
Id. at 5.
87
Id. at 6. Due to this format, and because advertising represents Pitt News’s sole source
of revenue, the length of the paper is directly determined by the amount of advertising
sales. Id. In the 1998–99 school year, the budget for Pitt News was $603,000. Id.
88
Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 102.
89
47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4-498(e)(4)–(5) (West 1997 & Supp. 2011). The statute stated:
(e) The following shall apply to all alcoholic beverage and malt
beverage advertising:
....
(4) The use in any advertisement of alcoholic beverages of any subject
matter, language or slogan directed to minors to promote consumption
of alcoholic beverages is prohibited. Nothing in this section shall be
deemed to restrict or prohibit any advertisement of alcoholic beverages
to those persons of legal drinking age.
(5) No advertisement shall be permitted, either directly or indirectly, in
any booklet, program book, yearbook, magazine, newspaper,
periodical, brochure, circular or other similar publication published by,
for or on behalf of any educational institution.
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forms of media.90 Act 199 was interpreted by state officials to apply only
to advertisers who paid for their advertisements in the mediums
proscribed by the law.91
On December 9, 1997, the general manager of the Pitt News received
a fax from the owner of Fuel & Fuddle, a local restaurant, canceling the
establishment’s advertising contract with the paper.92 Fuel & Fuddle
terminated the contract because the Bureau of Liquor Control
Enforcement sent a letter to the restaurant notifying the business that it
could be fined or have its alcohol license revoked for placing
advertisements for alcoholic beverages in a newspaper published by an
educational institution.93 To protect its advertisers, Pitt News stopped
accepting all alcoholic beverage advertisements.94
Subsequently, Pitt News filed a complaint against state officials, and
the case eventually reached the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.95 There,
Id.
47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4-498(g). The statute stated:
[T]he term “advertisement” shall mean any advertising of alcoholic
beverages through the medium of radio broadcast, television
broadcast, newspapers, periodicals or other publication, outdoor
advertisement or any other printed or graphic matter, including
booklets, flyers or cards, or on the product label or attachment itself.
Id. The punishment for violating this Act was a fine of up to $500 for the first offense and a
mandatory jail sentence of three months for each subsequent offense. Id. § 4-494(a).
91
Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 102. Faith Diehl, a representative of the Pennsylvania Liquor
Control Board, testified that Title 47, section 4-498 of the Pennsylvania code only applied to
advertisers, and not the media. Id. Further, she testified that, to be convicted under this
section, the media publishing the advertisement had to receive compensation for
placement of that advertisement. Id.
92
Id. at 103.
93
Id. Specifically, the letter stated that Fuel & Fuddle “had ‘advertised . . . alcoholic
beverages, either directly or indirectly, in a publication published by, for or in [sic] behalf
of an educational institution.’” Id. (alteration in original). Further, the Bureau of Liquor
Control Enforcement threatened to suspend or revoke Fuel & Fuddle’s liquor license. Id.
94
Id. In 1998, the practice of not accepting alcohol advertisements resulted in a $17,000
operating loss for the paper which, consequently, affected its length. Id.
95
Id. In April 1999, Pitt News filed a complaint and moved for a preliminary injunction
against the enforcement of Act 199, alleging a violation of freedom of the press, freedom of
expression, and equal protection of the law. Id. Initially, the district court denied the
injunction request, holding that Pitt News lacked standing. Id. On appeal, a panel of the
Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the injunction on behalf of the paper’s
advertisers and readers but held that Pitt News had standing for a First Amendment claim
of its own. Id. Despite this finding of standing, the court subsequently held that Pitt News
was unlikely to succeed on the merits and dismissed the case. Id. at 104. This case was
then taken by the Third Circuit for review. Id. The Third Circuit held that, by passing Act
199, the government aimed to discourage speech it deemed to have harmful content by
imposing a financial burden on the paper. Id. at 106. Therefore, Act 199 had to satisfy the
four-pronged Central Hudson test because it was a restriction on commercial speech. Id.
According to the court, Act 199 undisputedly passed the first and second prongs of the
90

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 9

626

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

the court held that the government had failed Central Hudson’s third
prong because it did not prove that Act 199 alleviated underage drinking
or alcohol abuse to a material degree.96 The court concluded that the
government had relied on speculation and conjecture to prove that
eliminating the advertisements in Pitt News would reduce underage
drinking, thus failing to meet the requirements outlined by the third
prong.97 Moreover, the court held that the government had not
established a reasonable fit between the legislature’s ends and the
narrowly tailored means chosen to accomplish those ends.98 The court
concluded that Act 199 was severely over- and under-inclusive.99
Furthermore, the court found that the government could have used
alternative methods to fight underage drinking.100 Although important,

Central Hudson test. Id. The court held that the first prong of the Central Hudson test was
met because the speech Pitt News was disseminating was for the lawful sale of alcoholic
beverages. Id. Also, Act 199 passed the second prong of the Central Hudson test because
the government had a substantial interest in preventing minors from drinking alcohol. Id.
96
Id. at 107. Act 199 only applied to media advertisements associated with educational
institutions, and the government did not produce any evidence that the ban on the
advertisements had any effect on curbing underage drinking. Id. Here, the court conceded
that any alcohol advertising is likely to encourage alcohol consumption, but there must be
some empirical evidence to show that the government’s strategy would actually result in
less underage consumption. Id.
97
Id. at 107–08. Regardless of the effect the advertisements in Pitt News have on
underage drinkers, students would still be exposed to alcohol advertisements through the
radio and television as well as other free weekly papers distributed throughout the city of
Pittsburgh. Id. at 107. The court expressed that:
Even if Pitt students do not see alcoholic beverage ads in The Pitt News,
they will still be exposed to a torrent of beer ads on television and the
radio, and they will still see alcoholic beverage ads in other
publications . . . . The suggestion that the elimination of alcoholic
beverage ads from The Pitt News and other publications connected
with the [u]niversity will slacken the demand for alcohol by Pitt
students is counterintuitive and unsupported . . . .
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. Act 199 prohibited seventy-five percent of the total population at the University of
Pittsburgh from legally receiving information about alcoholic products that they were
permitted to purchase. Id. Thus, the court concluded that Act 199, in effect, combated
underage drinking by restricting speech targeted at adults. Id.; see BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 1213 (over-inclusion describes legislation that extends
beyond the class of people that it was intended to protect or regulate); Underinclusiveness,
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM,
http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Underinclusiveness (last visited Nov. 10, 2010) (stating
that under-inclusion occurs when legislation prohibits some conduct, but fails to prohibit
other similar conduct).
100
Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 108 n.8. The court relied on a study conducted by the Harvard
School of Public Health to conclude that enforcement of drinking laws was implemented in
a half-hearted manner on college campuses. Id.
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Pitt News does not represent the only opinion on these facts. A strikingly
similar case, Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech v. Swecker, came out of
the Fourth Circuit.
2.

The Swecker Opinion

Swecker involved two different collegiate newspapers, the Collegiate
Times, published by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
and the Cavalier Daily, published by the University of Virginia.101 Both
newspapers rely heavily on advertising to stay within their budget.102
The Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control is a state
agency that controls the importation and distribution of alcoholic
beverages within Virginia.103 The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board
promulgated Section 5-20-40(B)(3), which prohibited advertisements of
alcoholic beverages in any college student publication.104 A college
student publication is defined as any college or university publication
that is: (1) prepared, edited, or published primarily by students; (2)
sanctioned as a curricular or extracurricular activity; and (3) distributed
or intended to be distributed primarily to persons under twenty-one
years of age.105
101
Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 587 (4th Cir. 2010). Both the Collegiate Times
and the Cavalier Daily are student-run newspapers that rely on advertising to operate. Id.
The Collegiate Times is owned by the Educational Media Company at Virginia Tech. Brief of
Appellees at 1, Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-1798), 2009
WL 1399396. The Collegiate Times is distributed free of charge to the Virginia Tech
community and is available at select locations around campus. Id. at 2. The Collegiate Times
is published four times a week and approximately 14,000 copies of the paper are circulated
daily during the fall and spring semesters. Id. at 1–2. The Cavalier Daily is owned by The
Cavalier Daily, Inc. Id. at 2. The Cavalier Daily is printed five days a week during the
school year, and about 10,000 copies of the paper are distributed free of charge to the
University of Virginia community each day. Id. Additionally, the Cavalier Daily is
distributed free of charge to the community at campus locations as well as off-campus, at
local restaurants near the University of Virginia. Id. at 3. As of September 2006, 49% of the
on-grounds students at the University of Virginia were under the age of twenty-one, and
51% of the students were over the age of twenty-one. Id. The paper’s readership also
includes university faculty and staff, who are generally over the age of twenty-one. Id.
102
Id. at 6–7. In 2005, 98.7% of the Collegiate Times’ budget came from advertising. Id.
103
Swecker, 602 F.3d at 586. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board serves three main
functions: (1) it is a law enforcement organization aimed at implementing Virginia’s
alcohol laws; (2) it is an educational organization designed to inform citizens about the
dangers of drinking; and (3) it is an administrative organization created to issue alcohol
licenses as well as revoke and suspend them through proceedings in administrative courts.
About ABC, VIRGINIA.GOV, http://www.abc.virginia.gov/admin/aboutabc.html (last
visited Dec. 24, 2010).
104
3 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-40 (B)(3) (2010), amended by 3 VA. ADMIN CODE § 5-2040(A)(2).
105
Id.
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As a result of this regulation, the Collegiate News and the Cavalier
Daily each lost $30,000 in revenue.106 Both organizations filed a
complaint alleging that their First Amendment rights had been
violated.107 The Fourth Circuit held that Section 5-20-40(B)(3) was a
constitutional restriction on commercial speech because it survived the
four prongs of the Central Hudson test.108 The court held Section 5-2040(B)(3) met the first prong of the Central Hudson test because the law
regulated truthful advertisements, which were lawfully directed at some
students and faculty that were twenty-one years of age or older.109
Additionally, the government met the second prong because the state
had a substantial interest in combating underage drinking.110 Under the
third prong of the Central Hudson test, the court found that the state’s ban
on alcohol advertising in collegiate newspapers did directly advance the
government’s substantial interest in eliminating underage alcohol
consumption.111 The court reasoned that history, consensus, or simple
common sense supported a causal link between the advancement of the
government’s substantial interest and the advertising ban.112 Concerning
the fourth prong of the analysis, the court held that there was a
reasonable fit between the government’s interest in decreasing underage
alcohol consumption and Section 5-20-40(B)(3)’s restriction on

Swecker, 602 F.3d at 587.
Id. Both newspapers asked the courts to grant them injunctive relief to enjoin the
enforcement of the Alcohol Beverage Control Board’s enforcement ability under the
regulation. Id.
108
Id. at 591. The court overturned the district court’s decision, holding that the
regulation was a facially unconstitutional ban on commercial speech. Id. at 587.
109
Id. at 589. The court held that, although the law was primarily intended to apply to
underage students, it did not restrict speech solely to underage students; rather, it
infringed on the rights of the “of age” students to receive the message, and therefore,
triggered the Central Hudson test protections. Id.
110
Id.
111
See id. at 590 (“[I]t is illogical to think that alcohol ads do not increase demand.”).
112
Id. at 589. The court held that a common sense link between alcohol advertising and
alcohol consumption could be found because alcoholic beverage companies would not
advertise in these publications if they did not believe that it would help sell their products.
Id. The court stated that, “[i]t is counterintuitive for alcohol vendors to spend their money
on advertisements in newspapers with relatively limited circulation, directed primarily at
college students, if they believed that these ads would not increase demand by college
students.” Id. Further, the court noted that the government did not need to produce any
empirical evidence to satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson test. Id. Moreover, the
court noted that the college newspapers did nothing to contradict this link or recognize the
distinction between advertisements in the local newspapers and advertisements in mass
media publications. Id. at 590. On the other hand, the dissent opposed the majority’s
analysis because “underage . . . drinking by college students has not diminished since the
enactment of this regulation; rather, the evidence demonstrates that the problem has grown
and exacerbated over time, despite the decades-old restriction.” Id. at 593–94 n.5.
106
107
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commercial speech.113 Further, the court held that the ban on alcohol
advertisements was sufficiently narrow and was a cost-effective
prevention method.114
Pitt News and Swecker are clear examples of the varying
interpretations of the Central Hudson test that have damaged the
solidarity of the commercial speech doctrine.115 The inconsistent
application of the Central Hudson test persists today mainly because of
multiple standards used by the Supreme Court and the divided
philosophies of the Justices.116

Id. at 590.
Id. at 591. The majority found that the alcohol ban in the newspapers was a
reasonable fit because it did not affect all possible publications on college campuses due to
the fact that it only limited the advertisements in publications that targeted students under
twenty-one years of age. Id. However, the dissent recognized that:
There is no evidence that these newspapers are “targeted at students
under twenty-one.” [Rather,] [t]he record reveals that the majority of
the readership of these newspapers is of legal age to drink.
Accordingly, under the fourth step of the Central Hudson test, the
regulation . . . is not “a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective . . . . ”
Id. (citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001)). Moreover, the court
conceded that, although the government may have other less restrictive and more effective
means in fighting underage drinking, this reasonably effective method of combating
underage drinking was sufficient to meet the reasonable fit standard. Id. at 591.
Alternatively, the dissent noted that, while the majority correctly recited that the law
restricting speech does not have to be the single best method of achieving the government’s
interest, it failed to realize that “a commercial speech restriction must be a necessary as
opposed to merely convenient means of achieving the [government’s] interests, and the
costs and benefits associated with the restriction must be carefully calculated.” Id. at 595
(internal quotations omitted). The dissent observed that there were more direct and less
restrictive means of decreasing alcohol consumption by minors on college campuses such
as: (1) increased taxation on alcohol; (2) counter-advertising to correct perceptions of
college drinking habits; and (3) publishing editorial pamphlets about alcohol abuse and
distributing them to college students and their parents. Id. at 596.
115
Compare Swecker, 602 F.3d at 589–90 (using the common sense standard to conclude
that alcohol advertising bans logically cause a decrease in drinking without any extrinsic
evidence and holding that the government’s ban on alcohol advertising in collegiate
newspapers had a reasonable fit with decreasing alcohol demand on college campuses),
with Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 2004) (using the material degree
standard to prohibit the government from banning alcohol advertisements in college
newspapers because the government had no evidence that eliminating alcoholic beverage
advertisements in college newspapers would combat underage or abusive drinking and
holding the fit between banning alcohol advertisements in college newspapers and
underage drinking was not reasonable).
116
See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(“[C]ommercial speech that is free from fraud or duress or the advocacy of unlawful
activity is entitled to only an ‘intermediate standard.’”); Id. at 778 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting). O’Connor stated that:
113
114
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III. ANALYSIS
Interpreting the Central Hudson test has been a difficult task for the
Supreme Court. Presently, the Court permits the use of both the material
degree standard and the common sense standard to prove that a
restriction on commercial speech directly advances a government
interest.117 This bifurcated analysis has created a split in the circuits
concerning the burden of proof necessary to show materiality.118
Moreover, the standard that governs Central Hudson’s fourth prong
remains unsettled due to the fact that the Supreme Court has not decided
a case on this prong for a decade, and less than a handful of cases have
applied the reasonable fit standard.119 Likewise, some individual Justices
on the Court have expressed concern over the legitimacy of the
commercial speech doctrine as a whole, while others have vehemently
I continue to believe that this Court took a wrong turn with Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona . . . . These cases consistently focus on whether the
challenged advertisement directly harms the listener . . . . This focus is
too narrow. In my view, the [s]tates have the broader authority to
prohibit commercial speech that, albeit not directly harmful to the
listener, is inconsistent with the speaker’s membership in a learned
profession and therefore damaging to the profession and society at
large.
Id.; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“I continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order
to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in
question may be characterized as ‘commercial.’”).
117
Compare Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770–71 (holding that more than mere speculation or
conjecture must be presented by the government to justify a restriction on commercial
speech), with Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995) (stating that “history,
consensus, and ‘simple common sense’” has been sufficient to justify restrictions on speech
in strict scrutiny cases).
118
See Hinegardner, supra note 31, at 570 (detailing the various approaches in regard to
the common sense standard that the lower courts have taken in interpreting the third
prong of the Central Hudson test).
119
See Reilly, 533 U.S. at 556 (holding that, in Florida Bar, the Court “made it clear that ‘the
least restrictive means’ is not the standard; instead, the case law requires a reasonable fit
between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends, . . . a means
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective’” (citations omitted)); Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at
632 (“In Fox, we made clear that the ‘least restrictive means’ test has no role in the
commercial speech context.”); Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477
(1989) (“Whatever the conflicting tenor of our prior dicta may be, we now focus upon this
specific issue for the first time, and conclude that the reason of the matter requires
something short of a least-restrictive means standard.”). But see 44 Liquormart, Inc., v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996) (suggesting that the least restrictive means test was
applicable because “[t]he [s]tate also cannot satisfy the requirement that its restriction on
speech be no more extensive than necessary. It is perfectly obvious that alternative forms
of regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to
achieve the [s]tate’s goal of promoting temperance.”).
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fought over its governing standards.120 Nevertheless, critics argue that
commercial speech should be protected to: (1) safeguard a consumer’s
right to receive truthful information about commercial products;121 (2)
limit over- and under-inclusion;122 (3) decrease the government’s
paternalistic actions;123 and (4) diminish the probability that the
government will act arbitrarily.124 Undeniably, the uncertainty
120
See Reilly, 533 U.S. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I continue to believe that when the
government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict
scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as
‘commercial.’”); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Since I do not believe
we have before us the wherewithal to declare Central Hudson wrong—or at least the
wherewithal to say what ought to replace it—I must resolve this case in accord with our
existing jurisprudence . . . . [Therefore,] I am not disposed to develop new law, or reinforce
old, on this issue, and accordingly I merely concur in the judgment of the Court.”); Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497–98 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In my opinion,
the Government’s asserted interest, that consumers should be misled or uninformed for
their own protection, does not suffice to justify restrictions on protected speech in any
context, whether under ‘exacting scrutiny’ or some other standard.”).
121
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763
(1976) (“As to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of [truthful] commercial
information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s
most urgent political debate.”); see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 495–96 (“Advertising has
been a part of our culture throughout our history. . . . In accord with the role that
commercial messages have long played, the law has developed to ensure that advertising
provides consumers with accurate information about the availability of goods and
services.”).
122
Compare Reilly, 533 U.S. at 585 (holding that a law prohibiting the advertisement of
tobacco to prevent children from smoking was over-inclusive if it also restricted adult
access to the information in the advertisement), and BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note
34, at 1213 (defining over-inclusion as legislation that “extend[s] beyond the class of
persons intended to be protected or regulated” and articulating that over-inclusive laws
burden more people “than necessary to cure the problem[s]” being targeted), with Linmark
Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 86, 93 (1977) (holding that a township
ordinance banning “For Sale” or “Sold” signs was under-inclusive because it only banned
the use of for sale signs for real estate, but permitted all other for sale signs in other
contexts), and THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, supra note 99 (defining under-inclusion as
legislation that prohibits some conduct but fails to prohibit other similar conduct).
123
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (stating that the government had “an
alternative to this highly paternalistic approach”). “[T]o assume that this information is not
in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them.” Id.; see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767
(1993) (stating that “[t]he commercial marketplace . . . provides a forum where ideas and
information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth.
But the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the
value of the information presented.”).
124
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 928 (expressing the idea that if government is to
decide what is true and right and suppress everything else, then government will
inevitably censor speech to serve its own ends); MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE
STRATEGY 28–29 (1980) [hereinafter COMPETITIVE STRATEGY] (arguing that the government
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surrounding the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test have
hampered the growth of the commercial speech doctrine and have
created irreconcilable differences between holdings in different
jurisdictions.125
Part III.A of this Note will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of
the differing standards given by the Supreme Court regarding the third
prong of the Central Hudson test.126 Specifically, Part III.A.1 will discuss
the material degree standard and Part III.A.2 will discuss the common
sense standard.127 Then, Part III.B will examine the strengths and
weaknesses of the differing standards handed down by the Court
concerning the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.128 In particular,
Part III.B.1 will evaluate the least restrictive means test and Part III.B.2
will assess the reasonable fit test.129 Lastly, Part III.C will evaluate the
implications of this issue if it is not resolved.130
A. Different Standards for Central Hudson’s Third Prong
Central Hudson held that the restriction on speech must directly
advance the government’s substantial interest.131 Over time, the Court
encountered cases that forced it to discern how much and what kinds of
evidence are needed to prove direct advancement.132 Presently, there are
is ill-equipped to advance or bar certain products or brands from the marketplace because
in so doing, it sets structural conditions that limit the behavior of firms, it affects the
position of an industry with regulations, subsidies, and other means, and it increases the
relative cost of doing business). Further, the government may ban products due to political
factors or pressure, rather than rational economic concerns. Id.
125
See supra Part II.B (discussing the various cases that utilize different approaches for
the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test).
126
See infra Part III.A (distinguishing the different standards mentioned by the Court
concerning the third prong of the Central Hudson test).
127
See infra Part III.A.1 and Part III.A.2 (explaining the diverse evidentiary thresholds of
the material degree and common sense standards).
128
See infra Part III.B (discussing the conflicting standards applied by the Court regarding
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test).
129
See infra Part III.B.1 and Part III.B.2 (exploring the repercussions resulting from an
application of the least restrictive means and reasonable fit standards to the fourth prong of
the Central Hudson test).
130
See infra Part III.C (pinpointing the long-term consequences of ignoring the different
standards set forth in the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test).
131
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
132
See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993) (finding that the state presented “no
studies that suggest personal solicitation of prospective business clients by CPA’s creates
the dangers of fraud, overreaching, or compromised independence that the Board claims to
fear” and that the government did “not disclose any anecdotal evidence, either from
Florida or another [s]tate, that validates the Board’s suppositions”); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985) (stating that,
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two radically different standards—the material degree standard and the
common sense standard—that courts can follow to satisfy this element of
the Central Hudson test.133 The two sections below will outline the
positive and negative aspects of each standard and explain how they
differ.
1.

The Material Degree Standard

The Supreme Court has appointed the third prong the vanguard of
the Central Hudson test.134 The material degree standard states that the
government can comply with the third prong of the Central Hudson test
only if it proves, through minimal empirical or anecdotal evidence, that a
restriction on speech directly furthers its interest.135 This safeguard
protects First Amendment rights from being violated by speculative

“nowhere does the [s]tate cite any evidence or authority of any kind for its contention that
the potential abuses associated with the use of illustrations in attorneys’ advertising cannot
be combated by any means short of a blanket ban”); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983) (holding that a law that criminalized sending information about
contraceptive through the mail was unconstitutional under the third prong of the Central
Hudson test because it “provide[d] only the most limited incremental support for the
interest asserted”); In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 205–06 (1982) (concluding that it was
unconstitutional for a state to reprimand an attorney for placing an advertisement in a
newspaper when “[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that the inclusion of this
information was misleading”).
133
See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770–71 (holding that the government must present some
evidence that its ban on commercial speech will reduce the harm done and that mere
speculation or conjecture will not suffice to meet this standard). But see Fla. Bar v. Went for
It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995) (holding that case law does not “require that empirical data
come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background information [and] . . . speech
restrictions [may be justified] by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different
locales altogether, or even, . . . based solely on history, consensus, and ‘simple common sense’”
(citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
134
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co, 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995). Justice Thomas writing for the
majority stated:
[A] governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial
speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree. We
cautioned that this requirement was critical; otherwise, a [s]tate could
with ease restrict commercial speech in the service of other objectives
that could not themselves justify a burden on commercial expression.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (“‘[T]he speech restriction
[must] directly and materially advanc[e] the asserted governmental interest.’”). However,
the Court does not “require that ‘empirical data come . . . accompanied by a surfeit of
background information . . . . [W]e have permitted litigants to justify speech restrictions by
reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether.’” Id.
(alterations in original).
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harms alleged by the government.136 Thus, by requiring a scintilla of
empirical or even anecdotal evidence, the government is prevented from
acting as a paternalistic force.137
Furthermore, if empirical evidence is necessary to prove a
correlation between commercial advertising and societal harm, then the
interference with citizens’ autonomy is less severe.138 As a consequence,
the government is required to prove objectively that a restriction on
speech will actually mitigate its cited harm.139 Therefore, before a
commercial message is arbitrarily taken off of the shelves of the
intellectual marketplace, depriving consumers of their constitutional
right to receive the message, the government will have to justify the
suppression of speech by pointing to empirical facts supporting its
action. The material degree standard can help prevent the government
from subjectively deciding what advertising is too harmful to hear or
what products are too dangerous to promote.140
Despite the apparently straightforward nature of the material degree
standard, the Court has convoluted the principle, and in so doing,
diluted its strength.141 In Edenfield, the Court held that the government
cannot “‘directly advance’” its interests through “mere speculation [and]

136
See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770 (holding that the government could not directly advance
its cited interest through “mere speculation or conjecture”).
137
See Hinegardner, supra note 31, at 557 (proposing “a significant, verifiable, and
reasonable quantum of evidence” standard to satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson
test, which would, in effect, reject the common sense standard).
138
See infra text accompanying note 141 (noting that the material degree standard can
help prevent the government from determining what advertising is too harmful or what
products are too dangerous to endorse).
139
Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional
Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 169 (2003). Zick states:
[L]egislative predictions, legislative theories and causal claims have
also come under heightened empirical examination. Theories like
market diminution, which have been accepted without empirical
support in the past, have been treated as implausible, judicially tested,
and found wanting. Causal claims which would be difficult, at best, to
empirically demonstrate have been rejected for lack of empirical
support. The clear trend is to treat legislative predicates as empirically
falsifiable propositions.
Id.
140
See, e.g., Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771 (holding that the government failed to meet the
third prong of the Central Hudson test when it banned certified public accountants from
soliciting new clients in-person as the government had no factual basis for believing that
this practice would further fraud).
141
See Hinegardner, supra note 31, at 570 (arguing that a material evidence test would
“prevent dilution of Central Hudson [and] intermediate scrutiny to an unlawful, de facto
rational basis level by providing the Court with an ample amount of evidence for it to
make an informed decision”).
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conjecture.”142 This implies that the government must present some hard
evidence to restrict commercial speech. Yet, this is not the approach that
the Supreme Court has taken.143 In fact, the Court has expressed that it
will uphold a law restricting commercial speech without the production
of any empirical evidence whatsoever.144 Therefore, this paradoxical
standard leaves practitioners with little guidance and lower courts
bewildered about what evidence is necessary to sustain a restriction on
commercial speech.145
2.

The Common Sense Standard

The Supreme Court has never expressly accepted the common sense
standard as a means to satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson
test.146 Nevertheless, this standard has been utilized by the First, Second,
142
Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770. The Court stated, “[t]his burden is not satisfied by mere
speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on
commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.” Id. at 770–71.
143
Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995). The Court stated:
In any event, we do not read our case law to require that empirical
data come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background information.
Indeed, in other First Amendment contexts, we have permitted
litigants to justify speech restrictions by reference to studies and
anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether, or even, in a case
applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history,
consensus, and “simple common sense.”
Id. (citations omitted).
144
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (“We do not, however,
require that ‘empirical data come . . . accompanied by . . . background information.’” (first
alteration in original)); see also Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 628 (holding that there does not need to
be a showing of any empirical evidence to sustain a ban on commercial speech because
“[n]othing in Edenfield, a case in which the [s]tate offered no evidence or anecdotes in
support of its restriction, requires more”).
145
Compare Pagan v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766, 777 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a city had to
produce sufficient empirical evidence showing that private commercial signs on streets
were a threat to motorists because “the intermediate scrutiny we apply in the commercial
speech context charges the government with the burden of justifying its chosen form of
regulation. Thus, even common sense decisions require some justification.”), with G.K. Ltd.
Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that legislative
deliberation, a dynamic dialogue with the city’s residents and businesses, extensive
hearings, and a city council’s reliance on the experience of other cities was sufficient
evidence to institute a commercial sign restriction on city roads).
146
Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 148
(1994). The Court suggested that the government must present some evidence of the causal
link between the government’s substantial interest and advertising when it stated, “[w]e
have never sustained restrictions on constitutionally protected speech based on a record so
bare as the one on which the [b]oard relies here.” Id. Arguably, the Court molded this new
interpretation of Central Hudson’s third prong from two sources. The most evident source,
which is cited in Florida Bar, is from Justice Blackmun’s plurality opinion in Burson v.
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Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts in
deciding commercial speech cases.147 Moreover, the common sense
standard can be justified on the grounds that progressive policy
implications result from its application.148
A principal benefit derived from the common sense standard is that
a presumption is created in favor of the government. It is assumed that,
if there is a correlation between advertising and demand for a particular
product, a statute or regulation directly advances the government’s
interest in restricting commercial speech.149 Legislators may utilize this
efficient and powerful tool when attacking advertisements that promote
Freeman. Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 628. In that case, the Court upheld a restriction on solicitors
distributing campaign materials to voters within 100 feet of a polling station’s entrance.
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992). The Court recognized both the First
Amendment right to free speech and the right to cast a ballot in an election free from the
taint of intimidation and fraud. Id. at 206–07. After applying strict scrutiny, the Court held
that “[a] long history, a substantial consensus, and simple common sense show that some
restricted zone around polling places is necessary . . . . Given the conflict between these
two rights, we hold that requiring solicitors to stand 100 feet from the entrances to polling
places does not constitute an unconstitutional compromise.” Id. at 211. Second, in Central
Hudson, the Court more subtly noted that “our decisions have recognized ‘the
“commonsense” distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction . . . and
other varieties of speech.’” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980).
147
See Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 589–90 (4th Cir. 2010) (using the
common sense standard to uphold a ban on alcohol advertising in college newspapers);
Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 92–96 (2d Cir. 2010) (using the common sense standard to
strike down a law banning attorney advertising); WV Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal
Servs. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 303–05 (4th Cir. 2009) (applying the common sense
standard to uphold a state ban on using a state’s video lottery system to advertise); IMS
Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 59 (1st Cir. 2008) (using the common sense standard to
allow the legislature to assume “that net medical outlays will decrease as a result of the
withdrawal of prescribing histories from detailers”); Pagan v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766, 777,
779 (6th Cir. 2007) (using the common sense standard to aid in reversing a district court’s
judgment that upheld a ban on parking automobiles with “For Sale” signs on public
streets); G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006)
(concluding that the common sense standard permits a ban on street signs to further the
city’s interest in improving traffic safety); Pac. Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d
1221, 1235 (10th Cir. 2005) (supporting using the common sense standard to invalidate a
city’s ordinance establishing a solicitor’s licensing procedure); Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am.
Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 655, 658 (8th Cir. 2003) (using the common sense standard to
approve a ban on unsolicited faxes containing advertisements because these faxes shifted
the costs of advertising from the sender to the recipient); Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952,
957–58 (11th Cir. 2000) (using the common sense standard to aid in invalidating a state bar
rule prohibiting self-laudatory advertisements by lawyers).
148
See infra notes 150–60 (discussing the policy implications of applying the common
sense standard).
149
See Swecker, 602 F.3d at 589–90 (holding that the common sense standard is met if the
government demonstrates a strong link between advertising bans and decreases in the
consumption of harmful products).
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harmful products.150 In effect, this standard provides a weapon to
preemptively strike commercial advertising that encourages unhealthy
behavior in society.151 Also, under the common sense standard,
government entities are not required to scour studies or collect data to
prove the obvious problems linked to a particular strain of commercial
speech.152
In some circumstances, there is limited or incomplete evidence to
support the government’s assertion that the commercial speech is
producing a precise harm.153 If only inadequate or underdeveloped
studies exist on the particular subject, then many municipalities and
state governments may be forced to abandon cases against harmful
commercial speech.154 This is likely due to the lack of adequate funding
or resources needed to complete the empirical studies and reports
required to prove the detrimental effects of the alleged commercial
harm.155 Alternatively, in many cases, the government cannot draw
Id.
See id. at 590 (holding that it is self-evident that alcohol vendors spend money on
advertisements in college newspapers because they believe these advertisements will
increase revenues and gross sales of their products).
152
See, e.g., Zick, supra note 60, at 132. Zick states:
[L]egal empiricists and their counterparts in other disciplines collected
heaps of data, but they had difficulty drawing conclusions from their
observations, which often pointed in several directions at once. With
indeterminate data, the empiricists failed to advance either the ruledetermination or predictive realist agendas. Essentially, empirical
stalemates left them with nowhere to go.
Id.
153
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1813 (2009) (“There are some
propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be marshaled” and that “[i]t is one
thing to set aside agency action . . . because of failure to adduce empirical data that can
readily be obtained.
It is something else to insist upon obtaining the
unobtainable.”(citation omitted)); see also Calvert & Bunker, supra note 57, at 773
(suggesting that empirical data must only play a limited part in determining the causation
element of a commercial speech case because empirical evidence can be too much of a good
thing if the persistence in pursuing it causes courts to overlook obvious moral and social
consequences of allowing certain commercial speech).
154
See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993) (holding that a state statute
prohibiting certified public accountants from conducting in-person solicitations to potential
clients was unconstitutional because the state had failed to present studies or anecdotal
accounts that certified public accountants were perpetuating fraud; thus, the state could
not continue its attack on this perceived danger); Zick, supra note 60, at 149–51 (comparing
and contrasting the Edenfield and Florida Bar cases to suggest that, under the current
Supreme Court interpretation, states cannot passively enact statutes limiting commercial
speech). Rather, states must get their hands dirty and find ways to collect empirical
evidence to support these restrictions or these laws will be declared void by the courts). Id.
at 149–51.
155
See Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1813 (stating that “[o]ne cannot [always]
demand a multiyear controlled study” to prove a purported harm).
150
151
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concrete conclusions from the evidence presented because social
scientists have collected such enormous sets of data, which offer several
different rational explanations of how the cited harm has been created.156
The common sense standard eliminates roadblocks such as the
administrative burden of creating volumes of reliable data and sifting
through conflicting reports, and therefore helps courts to reach a
decision on whether the advertising is linked to a societal harm.157
Some advertisements do not give much, if any, helpful or reliable
information to consumers about the company’s products.158 The central
premise of the commercial speech doctrine is that it grants consumers
the ability to gather the truthful information they need to make critical
daily economic decisions.159 Therefore, the undemanding nature of the
common sense standard aids the government in regulating harmful
advertisements by filtering out messages that have lost their
informational value, only allowing truthful advertising to reach
consumers.
Despite the benefits of adopting the common sense standard, lower
courts have not been able to come to a consensus over its interpretation
ever since the Court hinted at its viability.160 While many circuits
recognize the common sense standard, no two courts precisely agree on

See Zick, supra note 60, at 132 (arguing that social science stalemates produce poor
scientifically predictive observations that hinder reliable judicial outcomes and hamper
social value judgment).
157
See id. at 128–30 (stating that some legal formalism scholars believe that courts should
decide the constitutionality of rights and powers through concepts and hypothetical
examples, rather than through overwhelming, mundane, and sometimes contradictory
data).
158
See Shimp & Preston, supra note 2, at 22–23, 30 (concluding that more advertisers are
relying on deceptive, evaluative advertising that uses puffery and ambiguous terms to lure
in consumers, rather than factual advertising that can be objectively analyzed in the
product by looking at the inherent qualities of the product, because the Federal Trade
Commission has discouraged advertisers from using factual claims and evaluative
marketing protects brand name products).
159
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
160
See Hinegardner, supra note 31, at 548–52 (explaining that there are four classifications
of appellate court interpretations regarding the common sense standard). The four
classifications are: (1) the strong view, which holds that the court can utilize its common
sense in adjudicating commercial speech cases, but it must couple this with some empirical
evidence to support the existence of a public harm; (2) the legislative deference view, which
holds that the First Amendment requires states to assess their own interests realistically
and to take only reasonable steps in furtherance of these discerned interests; (3) the logical
nexus view, which holds that there is a legislative presumption that advertising increases
consumption; and (4) the irrationality view, which states that statutes riddled with
exceptions cannot directly and materially advance its purpose when other provisions of the
statute directly undermine or counteract the state’s interest. Id.
156
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how it is to be implemented.161 Additionally, confusion among lower
courts has produced an unclear definition of common sense.162 In some
cases, the government meets the third prong’s scrutiny merely by
alleging a specific harm and rationally tying it to commercial
In other jurisdictions, the connection between an
advertising.163
161
See Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 589–90 (4th Cir. 2010)
(using the logical nexus approach to the common sense standard to conclude that alcohol
advertising causes an increase in binge drinking); Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 92–96
(2d Cir. 2010) (advocating for the strong view of the common sense standard); WV Ass’n of
Club Owners & Fraternal Servs. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 303 (4th Cir. 2009) (applying the
logical nexus approach to the commonsense standard to hold that video advertising at
casinos may cause gambling addicts to compulsively spend money); IMS Health Inc. v.
Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2008) (adopting the legislative deference view to the
simple common sense standard); Pagan v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766, 782 (6th Cir. 2007)
(Rogers, J., dissenting) (holding that the strong view is the appropriate common sense
standard because “[i]t simply does not follow from Edenfield that [the government] is not
free, without evidence or studies, to make a common sense determination that allowing
business to be conducted in the street presents certain hazards”); G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of
Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting the legislative deference
standard to hold that legislative deliberation, a dynamic dialogue with the city’s residents
and businesses, extensive hearings, and a City Council’s reliance on the experience of other
cities was sufficient evidence to institute a commercial sign restriction on certain sizes,
types, and designs of advertisements on city roads); Pac. Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City,
414 F.3d 1221, 1235 (10th Cir. 2005) (supporting the strong view approach in applying the
common sense standard to invalidate a city’s ordinance establishing a solicitor’s licensing
procedure because it violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment commercial speech rights);
Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 654–55 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the legislative deference standard was the correct interpretation of the common sense
standard and proving that legislative findings showed that prohibitions on unsolicited
commercial fax advertisements directly and materially advanced the government’s
asserted interest); Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 957 (11th Cir. 2000) (expressing that the
strong view approach to the common sense standard was correct and that “the Supreme
Court has not accepted ‘common sense’ alone to prove the existence of a concrete, nonspeculative harm”).
162
Compare Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that no state
official had provided evidence that the elimination of alcohol advertisements in Pitt News
had “ma[d]e it harder for would-be purchasers to locate places near campus where
alcoholic beverages may be purchased” and “[c]ommon sense suggests that would-be
drinkers [would] have no difficulty finding those establishments despite” the law banning
these advertisements), with Swecker, 602 F.3d at 589 (“[C]ommon sense support[s] the link
between advertising bans in college newspapers and a decrease in demand for alcohol
among college students.”).
163
See Swecker, 602 F.3d at 590 (holding that an advertising ban on alcohol in college
newspapers passed the Central Hudson test because alcohol vendors would not advertise in
these publications unless they believed that it would increase consumption of their product
by underage college students); Musgrave, 553 F.3d at 305 (concluding that restrictions on
advertising on a state’s video lottery system avoided failing the third prong of the Central
Hudson test because there was a rational link between reducing the demand for the lottery
as well as the spread of private lotteries and restricting video advertising); Ayotte, 550 F.3d
at 59 (finding that a state legislature could reasonably assume that “net medical outlays
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advertisement and the government’s cited harm, however logical it may
be, has resulted in a dismissal of the case when it is not coupled with any
supporting empirical data.164
Moreover, the common sense standard is naturally paternalistic.165
In upholding government-sanctioned restrictions on commercial speech,
courts permit the government to establish what it thinks to be in the best
interests of its citizens.166 Consequently, citizens are limited in their
ability to make independent decisions about commercial products.
Furthermore, this method of government action effectively operates as a
prior restraint on free speech because it prohibits certain advertisements
from ever being disseminated, regardless of the balanced content
included in the advertisement.167 Messages can be pulled from the
media before ever appearing in a newspaper or over the airwaves. This
is an extreme measure; an alternative is to punish advertisers after

will decrease as a result of the withdrawal of prescribing histories from detailers”); G.K.
Ltd. Travel, 436 F.3d at 1073 (concluding that legislative dialogue and citizens’
communication with elected officials was enough to justify a link between restricting street
signs and improving traffic safety); Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d at 655, 658 (holding that a
state legislature could find a common sense link between unsolicited faxes containing
advertisements and preventing senders from shifting the cost of advertising to recipients).
164
See Alexander, 598 F.3d at 92 (holding that a thirty-day moratorium for targeted
solicitation following a specific incident, including targeted ads on television or in other
media, was unconstitutional because the government did not produce any evidence that
there were any consumer complaints or academic studies showing that attorney
advertising tarnished the profession’s integrity); Pagan, 492 F.3d at 777–78 (holding that a
city ordinance banning street signs could not be upheld because the city failed to provide
any evidence that the signs created an increase in traffic risks); Pac. Frontier, 414 F.3d at
1236 (finding that a city’s ban on solicitation without submitting a fingerprint sample and
posting a bond was unconstitutional because the city did not present any evidence that
these procedures would decrease damage done to private property by solicitors).
165
See Hinegardner, supra note 31, at 556–57 (suggesting that a challenger in a common
sense standard case could easily make an argument that a law is paternalistic because the
state in these cases does not have to produce any evidence before the court). Alternatively,
by making the government put forth evidence that “a proscriptive measure” is necessary,
the legislature has proof that its actions were legitimate. Id. at 556–57.
166
See id. at 554 (“Paternalism triggers hefty First Amendment consequences when
governments proceed under its auspices; the ‘government’s power ebbs when it tells us
what to say or hear for own good [sic].’”).
167
See Post, supra note 23, at 583 (arguing that past court decisions have encouraged
states to regulate commercial speech by using prior restraints because of “the assumption
that the constitutional value of commercial speech lies in the circulation of information
rather than in the independent interests of commercial speakers”); see also Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980) (stating in
dicta that prior restraints on commercial speech may be permissible because the expression
of self-interested marketers should be subject to extensive regulation and advertisers are in
the best position to evaluate the accuracy of their statements).
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publishing false or misleading assertions.168 If this occurs, then honest
marketers are prevented from making truthful information available to
consumers. Further, public advertisements may be the only warning
about specific products or services that reach consumers, even if this
message is found in a small disclaimer or written in fine print.169
The common sense approach allows the government to zealously
protect its citizens against misleading or false advertisements that
threaten unsuspecting consumers.170 However, this presumes that
consumers are incapable of making informed decisions for themselves
and are unable to see through the veil of vague, yet captivating,
commercial advertisements.171 Further, it assumes that the government
has a foolproof method to protect its constituents—with or without
supporting empirical data. Like the third prong of the Central Hudson
test, the fourth prong has been clouded by multiple standards and
different interpretations that have shifted throughout its existence.

168
See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554, 559–60 (1976) (stating that
professional discipline, defamation, and other civil sanctions should be instituted as
alternatives to prior restraints due to the fact that the postponement or concealment of
speech may totally prevent important ideas from ever reaching the public).
169
See Richard J. Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (1966)
(arguing that the government has monopolistically sided with producers in promoting a
free enterprise economy and has limited information for consumers). But see About Us,
PARTNERSHIP DRUGFREE.ORG, http://www.drugfree.org/about (last visited Nov. 10, 2010)
(implementing a national campaign aimed at translating current research on teen behavior,
publicizing information about addiction and treatment, and suggesting resources for
parents and drug users); FAQ’s, TRUTH, http://www.thetruth.com/faq (last visited Oct.
21, 2010) (disseminating facts to the public on behalf of the American Legacy Foundation
about the harmful effects of tobacco products and the manipulative strategies tobacco
companies use to advertise their products); Get the Facts, ABOVETHEINLUENCE.COM,
http://www.abovetheinfluence.com/facts/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2010) (publicizing the
dangers of prescription drugs, alcohol, marijuana, methamphetamines, inhalants, and
ecstasy to the public on behalf of the Office of National Drug Control Policy).
170
See supra Part III.A.2 (noting that the common sense standard allows the government
to protect citizens from alleged commercial harms by banning advertising when there is
little evidence to support these claims or to show that the costs of obtaining such
information would be burdensome).
171
See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (“[We reject] the notion
that the Government has an interest in preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial
information in order to prevent members of the public from making bad decisions with the
information.”); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (“[B]ans against
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech . . . usually rest solely on the offensive
assumption that the public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the truth. [Yet,] [t]he First
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in
the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.”(citation omitted)).
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B. Different Standards for Central Hudson’s Fourth Prong
Although the Court may have unintentionally created ambiguity in
the analysis of the third prong of the Central Hudson test, it is undisputed
that a fierce battle exists over the precise standard that should govern the
fourth prong.172 Since the birth of the test, the Court has debated
whether the least restrictive means standard should be applied.173
Alternatively, many Justices strongly believe that the reasonable fit
standard should be implemented.174 Currently, the reasonable fit
standard is being used by the Court, and according to this standard, the
government must demonstrate the narrow tailoring of a challenged
regulation to its asserted interest—a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable—that represents not necessarily the single best disposition
but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.175
Nevertheless, due to the back-and-forth history of this prong, the
legitimacy of the reasonable fit standard remains questionable.176 The
172
Compare 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 524 n.6 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the
Court has held, in decisions such as Discovery Network, that “commercial speech restrictions
[are] impermissible if alternatives are ‘numerous’ and obvious”), with id. at 529 (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (arguing that the proper inquiry about the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test concerns the fit between the government’s goal and the legislature’s method
“that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single
best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served”).
173
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (holding that a restriction on commercial speech could not be more extensive than
necessary to serve the government’s substantial interests); see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at
507 (“[A]lternative forms of regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech
would be more likely to achieve the [s]tate’s goal of promoting temperance.”); Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (“The FAAA’s defects are further highlighted
by the availability of alternatives that would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment’s
protections for commercial speech.”).
174
See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999). The
Court held that:
Government is not required to employ the least restrictive means
conceivable, but it must demonstrate narrow tailoring of the
challenged regulation to the asserted interest—“a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the
interest served.”
Id. The Court has also expressed that “our [past] decisions upholding the regulation of
commercial speech cannot be reconciled with a requirement of least restrictive means.” Bd.
of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479 (1989).
175
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 188.
176
Compare id. at 188–89 (reaffirming the reasonable fit standard), and Fox, 492 U.S. at 480
(stating that narrowly tailored in the commercial speech context means that there “is a
‘“fit” between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends’—a fit
that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served’”(citation omitted)),
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two sections below analyze the pros and cons of implementing each
standard.
1.

The Least Restrictive Means Test

In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Court found that the government
must show that the restriction on commercial speech is “no more
extensive than necessary to serve” the government’s substantial
interest.177 To meet this standard, the government is required to prove
that its goal is narrowly tailored so that there is no less speech restrictive
Therefore, the “no more extensive than
alternative available.178
necessary” standard exponentially increases the burden of proof that the
government must carry to constitutionally restrict commercial speech.
This approach also pushes the Court’s standard of review towards strict
scrutiny.179
The least restrictive means test is attractive for a number of reasons.
First, it creates a bright-line rule in the blurry area of law pertaining to
commercial speech.180 If a court finds that there is a more moderate
approach to containing a societal harm than completely banning a
particular product’s advertisements, the challenger easily wins the
case.181 Moreover, if a speech restrictive law does pass this lofty
standard, the elimination of that message is truly necessary to protect the

with 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507 (“It is perfectly obvious that alternative forms of
regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to
achieve the [s]tate’s goal of promoting temperance.”), and Rubin, 514 U.S. at 491 (affirming
that if “alternatives that would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment’s protections”
exist, then a law restricting commercial speech must be declared unconstitutional).
177
514 U.S. at 486.
178
See id. at 491 (“[T]he availability of [alternative] options, all of which could advance
the Government’s asserted interest in a manner less intrusive to respondent’s First
Amendment rights, indicates that [a law] is more extensive than necessary.”).
179
See, e.g., Fallon, Jr., supra note 13, at 1326 (stating that the narrow tailoring requirement
used in Supreme Court strict scrutiny cases is synonymous with the least restrictive
alternative standard).
180
See Howell, supra note 64, at 1094 (stating that “[t]he Court purports to apply a
standard that lies somewhere between a ‘rational basis’ test and a ‘least restrictive means’
test,” and arguing that the Court has left practitioners confused because they have avoided
drawing a bright line rule); see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, 419 (1993) (rejecting the least restrictive means test as the standard for the fourth prong
of the Central Hudson test and refusing to draw “bright lines that will clearly cabin
commercial speech in a distinct category”).
181
See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 524 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that if there are
obvious alternatives to restricting commercial advertising, such as rationing, taxing, or
controlling the price of products, then a ban on commercial speech ought to fail.).
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well-being of consumers.182 Second, the least restrictive means test can
stifle the harmful effects of over-inclusive commercial speech laws.183
Under the heavy burden of proof associated with the least restrictive
means test, the government’s attempts to paternalistically suppress
speech can be thwarted.184 Therefore, the least restrictive means test
prohibits the government from drafting overreaching laws that could
potentially ban truthful commercial content.185 Third, by requiring the
government to use the least restrictive method on speech to achieve its
goal, the government is more apt to combat harmful conduct, rather than
mute truthful speech.186 Alternatives such as increased taxation and
removal of the harmful products from the marketplace pose less of a
burden on the First Amendment and more logically achieve the goal of
eliminating harm.187 Therefore, by using the least restrictive means
standard, the government is still able to achieve its desired result and
avoid entangling itself in the First Amendment’s net.
182
See id. at 523–26 (stating that if all other methods have failed to protect consumers
from harmful products, then a ban on advertising should be permitted; however, this
ought to be a tool that is used as a last resort).
183
See Fallon, Jr., supra note 13, at 1328 (stating that it is uncertain exactly how the least
restrictive means and over-inclusiveness relate to one another, but it can be said that strict
scrutiny will be satisfied and the least restrictive means test will be met “as long as no
narrower regulation would suffice, [and] the prohibition against over-inclusiveness
suggests that a statute might be condemned for lack of narrow tailoring even if no less
restrictive alternative existed”); Volokh, supra note 65, at 1136 (stating that it is unclear
whether a least restrictive means test will meet strict scrutiny, even if the regulation is overinclusive).
184
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 578 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that “the sweeping overinclusivity of the regulations” is impermissible if the state
“has done nothing to target its prohibition to advertisements appealing to ‘excitement,
glamour, and independence’; the ban applies with equal force to appeals to torpor,
homeliness, and servility”).
185
See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510 (using the least restrictive means test to
“conclude that a state legislature does not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful,
nonmisleading information for [the] paternalistic purposes” of creating temperance
throughout its population).
186
See id. at 502–03 (expressing that a state’s interest in protecting consumers from
“‘commercial harm[]’” is the reason why commercial speech is subject to intermediate
scrutiny; however, “bans that target truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages rarely
protect consumers from such harms. Instead, such bans often serve only to obscure an
‘underlying governmental policy’ that could be implemented without regulating
speech”(footnote omitted)).
187
See id. at 507 (“[A]lternative forms of regulation that [do] not involve any restriction
on speech would be more likely to achieve the [s]tate’s goal . . . . As the [s]tate’s own
expert conceded, higher prices can be maintained either by direct regulation or by
increased taxation.”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 498 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“Congress may limit directly the alcoholic content of malt beverages. But
Congress may not seek to accomplish the same purpose through a policy of consumer
ignorance, at the expense of the free speech rights of the sellers and purchasers.”).
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Nonetheless, the least restrictive means standard severely impairs
the government’s ability to regulate commercial harms.188 Under that
approach, the government may find it extremely difficult to withstand
First Amendment scrutiny if there is a plausible alternative to restricting
commercial speech.189 For example, the government might believe that
imposing a tax on a particular product will achieve the same change in
consumer behavior as would a restriction on advertising.190 However,
the government could be forced to ignore the harmful effects of a
product if it does not want to take the drastic measure of taxing an entire
population for the item.191
Therefore, the least restrictive means standard hinders the
government’s ability to attack societal problems from multiple vantage
points.192 Additionally, it forces legislators into a Catch-22, compelling
them to make a choice between eliminating products from the
marketplace altogether, increasing the tax on those allegedly harmful
items, or ignoring the potential harm being done to society. At its most
extreme, the ban it-, tax it-, or forget about it-rationale may coerce
legislators into commiting political suicide by requiring them to either
choose between banning a popular commercial product—such as
188
See generally Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989)
(stating that the Court will “take account of the difficulty of establishing with precision the
point at which restrictions become more extensive than their objective requires, and
provide the [l]egislative and [e]xecutive [b]ranches needed leeway in a field (commercial
speech) ‘traditionally subject to governmental regulation’”).
189
See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993) (“A
regulation need not be ‘absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end,’ but if
there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on
commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the
‘fit’ between ends and means is reasonable.”(citation omitted)); Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (stating
that “the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on
would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing . . . the harmless from the harmful,” but the
Court will not “impose upon [the government] the burden of demonstrating that the
[differentiation] is 100% complete, or that the manner of restriction is absolutely the least
severe that will achieve the desired end”; rather, the Court will give deference to
“governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be
employed” (internal quotations omitted)).
190
See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 509 (recognizing that the Rhode Island legislature
decided that a ban on price advertising of alcohol would achieve the same result in
promoting temperance as an increase in taxes).
191
See, e.g., id. at 504–07 (holding that Rhode Island unconstitutionally banned price
advertising of alcohol because the less speech restrictive alternative of increasing taxes on it
existed and that, through taxes, the state could promote temperance).
192
See, e.g., id. at 530 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the government’s ban on
advertising ought to fail if alternatives controlling consumer behavior, such as
administering taxes, limiting per capita purchases, conducting educational campaigns, or
prohibiting the sale of the product feasibly exist, even if these measures would not produce
exactly the same results).
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cigarettes or alcohol—or remaining passive in the face of a serious
danger that the product poses society—either way angering one or more
groups of people.193
2.

The Reasonable Fit Standard

The current standard adopted by the Court concerning Central
Hudson’s fourth prong is the reasonable fit standard.194 Under this
standard, the government is given deference in determining how to meet
its objectives.195 Specifically, the government can impose restrictions on
commercial speech if the costs and benefits of the burden on speech are
“carefully calculated.”196
The reasonable fit standard gives the government an enhanced
ability to stop commercial harms.197 The government can obstruct efforts
to market harmful products without making these items illegal.198
Therefore, with multiple methods available to tackle the societal
problems caused by advertising dangerous products, the government is
not forced into an all-or-nothing ultimatum.199
Further, this standard limits over-inclusion by not requiring the
government to impose a total ban on select commercial products to all

193
See infra text accompanying notes 201–03 (explaining that bans on advertising are an
alternative that legislators would rationally use to limit the negative effects of harmful
products on the public).
194
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (finding that there must be
a “fit” between a commercial speech restriction’s ends and means, which does not need to
necessarily be perfect, but must be reasonable (internal quotation marks omitted)).
195
Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
196
See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993) (holding
that a city did not “‘carefully calculate[]’ the costs and benefits associated with the burden
on speech imposed by its prohibition” on news racks).
197
Reilly, 533 U.S. at 561. For example, the Court has articulated that restrictions on the
size and placement of advertisements may all be regulated. Id. at 563. Further, the
government may impose restrictions on the distance of certain advertisements in relation to
particular locations such as churches, schools, or parks. Id. at 561–62. The Court has even
held the government may restrict how the advertisement is communicated to the recipient.
Id. at 563. This means that the government can selectively or comprehensively ban oral,
written, or visual advertisements. Id. at 561–63.
198
See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986) (arguing
that the government has the power to completely ban gambling; therefore, it should have
the less intrusive power of restricting advertising for it). But see id. at 359 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing that the government has the power to prohibit activities such as
gambling, prostitution, or the consumption of marijuana or liquor, but might not have the
power to restrict speech about these items).
199
See supra Part III.B.1 (arguing that by using the least restrictive means standard the
government is often forced to either ban the product completely or ignore the threat to
society to appease the voters that use the dangerous product in question).
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groups.200 Although commercial advertising for the alleged product may
be diminished, the product in question can still be accessed on the open
market, and thus its utility can still be spread through word-of-mouth
communication.201 Moreover, the reasonable fit standard limits underinclusion because the government can simply limit the time, place, and
manner of the advertisements, rather than make tough decisions on
which products to completely ban, restrict access to, or absolutely
tolerate.202
However, the reasonable fit standard does have pitfalls. First, it is
highly paternalistic.203 This standard gives the government deference to
make a carefully calculated cost-benefit analysis in deciding whether to
prohibit commercial speech.204 This means that the government’s
decision to restrict commercial speech will be respected as long as
truthful commercial information can plausibly get to consumers in an
alternative form or method.205 This strategy gives the government
200
See supra note 123 (stating that over-inclusion occurs when legislation extends beyond
the class of persons or things that it was intended to protect or regulate and burdens more
people or things than necessary to cure the problems targeted).
201
See Harvir S. Bansal & Peter A. Voyer, Word-of-Mouth Processes within a Services
Purchase Decision Context, 3 J. SERV. RESEARCH 166, 175 (2000) (finding that word-of-mouth
advertising for services is extremely effective when there is a close relationship between a
sender and a receiver and the receiver’s high knowledge or expertise for a given service);
Paula Fitzgerald Bone, Word-of-Mouth Effects on Short-Term and Long-Term Product
Judgments, 32 J. BUS. RESEARCH 213, 221–22 (1995) (determining that word-of-mouth
advertising can be more effective than print advertising and expert word-of-mouth
advertising messages have a stronger effect than non-expert opinions; both negative and
positive word-of-mouth messages have short- and long-term effects on the consumption
rates of consumers).
202
See Bayer, supra note 4, at 356–59 (exploring the implications of proposed FDA
regulations and the congressional efforts to ban tobacco advertising); Vladeck et al., supra
note 80, at 33–34 (expressing the tension between the government and commercial
advertisers over the burden of proof when the government restricts particular messages
from being publicized when there is insufficient data to prove that the message is harmful
or inaccurate).
203
See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the proposition that deference should be given
to legislators for commercial speech and stating that the Central Hudson test should not be
applied to uphold the government’s interest in keeping “legal users of a product or service
ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace”).
204
See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993) (concluding
“that the city failed to address its . . . concern about newsracks by regulating their size,
shape, appearance, or number[, which] indicates that it has not ‘carefully calculated’ the
costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibition”).
Further, the ordinance failed to meet the reasonable fit standard as applied to newsracks
because it was enacted to combat littering, not permanent fixtures on city streets. Id.
205
See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 529–30 (1996) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“If alternative channels permit communication of the restricted speech, the
regulation is more likely to be considered reasonable.”).
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unfettered power to limit commercial speech via particular mediums,
substantially diluting the message, or significantly diminishing the
listening audience.206
Therefore, having complete authority to prohibit the transmission of
commercial messages through specific mediums and in particular
manners, the government can effectively divert certain ideas from the
information superhighway.207 This approach can lead consumers astray
and affect their choices regarding which products to purchase.208 Unless
consumers use personal initiative to learn about certain products from
private sources, or the government actively launches its own
informational advertising campaign to warn constituents about
potentially harmful products, it is unlikely that citizens will ever obtain
the knowledge they need to optimally direct their behavior.
C. Potential Implications if the Issues Remain Unresolved
The Court must eliminate the bifurcated analysis that exists in the
Central Hudson test. This change can be done by expressly accepting
either the material degree standard or the common sense standard and
reaffirming the use of the reasonable fit test.209 If nothing is done about
Central Hudson’s distorted interpretation, then the consequences of its
ambiguity will only become more exaggerated.210 If the Supreme Court
does not intervene soon, the split in the circuits over the interpretation of
206
See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 6, Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004) (No.
03-1725), 2003 WL 24302476 (articulating that Pitt News used a fifty-fifty format, where the
newspaper’s pages with news content equaled its pages with advertisements; further,
when the state banned alcohol advertising in the paper, the newspaper was forced to
eliminate actual news articles as well to decrease its cost in producing the newspaper after
it lost critical advertising revenue).
207
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 928 (explaining that many scholars fear that if the
government is able to fully control speech, then it will inevitably abuse this power to
advance its own goals, and many truthful messages will be censored from the general
public).
208
See, e.g., COMPETITIVE STRATEGY, supra note 124, at 108–09 (stating that most
manufacturers sell their products to many different buyers, who in turn use these products
in different ways). Therefore, it is essential for manufactures to utilize every strategy
possible to reach out to the buyer, including advertising, to meet the consumer’s demands
for quality, quantity, durability, and customer service; moreover, rational consumers will
not buy a manufacturer’s product unless their educational needs regarding the product are
thoroughly satisfied. Id.
209
See infra Part IV.A (arguing that the Court should adopt the material degree standard).
210
Compare Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 589–90 (4th Cir. 2010) (using the
common sense standard to conclude that alcohol advertising logically causes an increase in
underage drinking without any extrinsic evidence), with Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96,
107 (3d. Cir. 2004) (using the material degree standard to prohibit government from
banning alcohol advertisements in college newspapers because the government had no
evidence that newspaper advertisements lead to underage or abusive drinking).
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the third prong will continue to grow. This split is particularly
troublesome for national retailers and marketers.211 Inconsistent results
throughout the judicial system may cause businesses to refuse to enter
certain markets and deliberately exit others.212 Further, it is egregious to
allow the First Amendment to be applied in a disparate manner
throughout the nation.
These differing interpretations of the Central Hudson test especially
harm small business, which rely solely on advertising to attract a
customer base.213 For example, a tobacco shop on the East Coast may be
forced to shut down due to a restriction on advertising interpreted under
the common sense approach; however, a similar business in the Midwest
could prosper because its speech was interpreted under the material
degree standard.214 Ultimately, these inconsistencies will either coerce
businesses out of one market and force them into another that allows
particular commercial advertising, or compel them to close shop
forever.215 Alternatively, those businesses that do thrive will be more apt
to form oligopolies and monopolies.216
Without advertisements,
consumers will be unable to make informed decisions as to what

See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 40, 56 (1985) [hereinafter
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE] (finding that many large domestic and international firms rely
on geographical interrelationships, such as uniformity in the law, to keep the costs of their
product low and to universally coordinate value activities, one of which is marketing and
sales).
212
See COMPETITIVE STRATEGY, supra note 124, at 13 (articulating that government
policies, such as licensing or controls, are a major barrier that can limit or foreclose entry
into industries).
213
See Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 595 (“An overbroad set of regulations that unfairly
singles out the commercial use of recorded phone messages fails to substantially advance
the government’s interest in protecting home privacy and excludes measures that would
address privacy concerns in an even-handed manner without unduly burdening the First
Amendment rights of small businesses.”).
214
See, e.g., supra Part II.C (describing how Pitt News was permitted to solicit alcoholic
beverage vendors and recoup its advertising revenue after the Third Circuit struck down
Pennsylvania’s law banning alcohol advertisements in education-related media, but the
Cavalier Daily and the Collegiate Times were forced to cut sections from their newspapers
after the Fourth Circuit held that the newspapers had to comply with Virginia’s ban on
alcoholic beverage advertisements in education-related media).
215
See COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 211, at 448–55 (stating that uncertainties,
such as government policies, affect competition through industry structure and cause
companies to adjust their strategies, leading some companies to determine that a once
fertile market has too-high entry barriers or that competition has dwindled, so that exiting
a particular market is in the best interest of the company).
216
See Jackson & Jeffries, Jr., supra note 22, at 28 (concluding that “it seems plausible to
assume that the consequence of a reduced flow of information will lead to some situational
monopolies that would not exist if advertising were unrestricted”; this would lead to lower
economic efficiency).
211
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products and services are superior in quality or price.217 Thus, brandname products may take over the market if consumers are unaware of
potentially better opportunities elsewhere.218
Given the unique opportunity to adjudicate the Pitt News and
Swecker cases, which strangely parallel each other, the Court can put to
rest the contention over the conflicting interpretations.219 Additionally,
the commercial speech doctrine would finally be able to blossom, and
the goal of the Central Hudson Court to move away from a case-by-case
analysis will come to fruition at last.220
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Confusion will continue to cloud the commercial speech doctrine if
courts use varying standards for the third prong of the Central Hudson
test and the Supreme Court does not provide the proper standard for the
fourth prong.221 The circuit in which a business is located should not be
determinative in adjudicating whether the business has the ability to
promote a particular product.222 Therefore, the Supreme Court, to mend
the contradictory interpretations that have created inconsistency and
ambiguity in the commercial speech doctrine, must reconcile the
conflicting standards that it has created.223
217
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 766–71
(1976) (noting that price competition between retailers can be a positive economic policy
and that consumers will not necessarily choose the best price for a product if it diminishes
the quality of service that they get in return for their money).
218
See id. (finding that it is better to assume that commercial information itself is not
harmful and that people will rationally balance the quality, the price, and other
characteristics of services and products before they buy from a particular retailer if they are
equipped with all possible material information).
219
See supra Part II.C.1 and Part II.C.2 (outlining the factual similarities of Pitt News and
Swecker).
220
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–
66 (1980) (creating a four prong test to deal with commercial speech cases after the Court
recognized that commercial speech was entitled constitutional protection in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 526–27 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“The courts, including this Court, have found the Central Hudson ‘test’ to be,
as a general matter, very difficult to apply with any uniformity.”).
221
See supra Part III.A and Part III.B (analyzing how courts have struggled to uniformly
adopt either the material degree standard or the common sense standard for the third
prong of Central Hudson’s interpretation and how the Supreme Court has flip-flopped on
the least restrictive means and reasonable fit standards over the past twenty years for the
fourth Central Hudson prong).
222
See supra Part III.C (stating that the results of similar cases in different circuits can
have drastically different outcomes depending on whether the common sense standard or
the material degree standard is employed).
223
See supra text accompanying notes 173–77 (outlining the existing battle over the
precise standard that should govern the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test).
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First, Part IV.A will argue that the burden of proof for the third
prong should rest on the material degree standard.224 Second, Part IV.B
will suggest elements the Court should adopt in analyzing the third
prong.225 Third, Part IV.C will argue that the reasonable fit test should
be confirmed as the standard for the fourth prong and propose a set of
factors courts can employ in adjudicating this prong.226 Finally, Part
IV.D will discuss the implications of this new test for the Pitt News and
Swecker decisions.227
A. The Burden of Proof
The burden of proof in commercial speech cases should be the
material degree standard.228 This would require the government to
present empirical evidence supporting any commercial speech ban.229
The goal of the government should be to increase the availability of
information to the public, not to restrict it. This standard would allow
substantive information to flow to the public. Also, the government
would appear to be acting with valid authority when it attempts to
protect society from harmful advertising, rather than appearing as a
paternalistic force in its citizens’ lives.230
Further, in keeping with traditional constitutional law norms, the
government has the burden of proof in intermediate scrutiny cases. By
placing the burden of proof on the government in commercial speech
cases, the Court would continue to apply a consistent, bright-line rule for
all intermediate scrutiny cases, instead of creating different standards

224
See infra Part IV.A (stating that the material degree standard should govern the third
prong of the Central Hudson test because factual evidence ought to be required before the
government can justify a restriction on a person’s right to freedom of speech).
225
See infra Part IV.B (arguing that sub-elements must be placed under the third prong of
the analysis to ensure that the government does not arbitrarily or wrongfully deprive
commercial advertisers of their speech rights).
226
See infra Part IV.C (articulating that the reasonable fit test should be confirmed as the
correct standard for the fourth prong and that a factors test should be used to guide
decisions so that they are not determined solely on a case-by-case basis).
227
See infra Part IV.D (arguing that the newly proposed test would harmonize the
conflicting Pitt News and Swecker decisions because they would both fail under this
analysis).
228
See supra Part III.A.1 (articulating the pros and cons of the material degree standard).
229
See supra Part III.B (arguing that the reasonable fit standard safeguards the public
from a paternalistic government because it requires hard evidence that there is a societal
harm being caused by a particular strain of commercial speech).
230
See supra text accompanying notes 123 and 124 (noting that critics argue commercial
speech should be protected to limit over- and under-inclusion and governmental
paternalism).
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within the doctrine.231 Therefore, in commercial speech cases, the
government should have the burden of proof to show that its interest in
limiting commercial speech is materially advanced through empirical
evidence.
B. Sub-Elements of the Third Prong of Central Hudson
To ensure that the government does not arbitrarily restrict
commercial speech, the following test for Central Hudson’s third prong
should be implemented: (1) the target group must actually suffer an
injury from the commercial speech; (2) the defendant, disseminating
information individually, must substantially cause the injury to the
target group; and (3) a favorable judgment must materially mitigate the
harm done to the target group.
First, the government must prove that the target group actually
suffered an injury. This proof can be shown by: (1) identifying the
group of people that the government wishes to protect; and (2) offering
statistical evidence to show the existence of a causal relationship
between particular strains of commercial speech and the harm done to
the specific group. By mandating that the government offer empirical
evidence to uphold a restriction on commercial speech, the Court would
instantly legitimize the injury done to society.232 Further, the Court
would promote awareness of how consumers psychologically respond to
certain advertisements. Additionally, by forcing states and
municipalities to hypothesize about the harms allegedly created as a
result of advertising and to produce data to support these claims, the
government would give academics the ability to analyze data
nationwide in order to determine the likely cause of the specific societal
harm.233
Second, the government must prove that the defendant, acting alone,
is causing harm to society. This criterion would prevent the underinclusive censoring of commercial speech, such as prohibiting printed
advertisements when television advertisements substantially add to the
harm as well.234 Further, the government would be able to list
231
See supra text accompanying note 117 (explaining that courts inconsistently apply
Central Hudson because the Court has subsequently applied different standards and
because the Justices are divided philosophically).
232
See supra Part III.A.1 (arguing that speculative evidence presented by the government,
without any factual data, appears paternalistic).
233
See supra Part III.A.1 (stating that the government must point to some scintilla of
evidence either in the form of statistics or anecdotes to justify a restriction on commercial
speech).
234
See supra text accompanying note 100 (describing Pitt News, where the Third Circuit
found Act 199 was dangerously over- and under-inclusive).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/9

Passalacqua: Something's Brewing within the Commercial Speech Doctrine

2012]

Something’s Brewing

653

companies in a specific industry as joint defendants showing that, acting
together, they are the root cause of the harm.
Third, the government must prove that its action materially
mitigates the harm done by commercial speech. To satisfy this subelement, the government would have to prove, through empirical
evidence, that its action against an advertisement actually reduces a
particular threat to society.235 In other words, the government must have
factual proof before it closes any channels of communication.
C. Reaffirmation of the Reasonable Fit Test and Proposed Factors
To give the Central Hudson test a solid foundation and thus
strengthen the commercial speech doctrine, the Supreme Court must
reaffirm its holding that the reasonable fit test governs the fourth
prong.236 Likewise, the Court must provide criteria for determining
what is a reasonable fit to opt out of a case-by-case approach to the
commercial speech doctrine.
One possible way of creating this structured analysis is through a
factors test. Factors a court can utilize in assessing the fit between the
means and ends of a restriction on commercial speech are: (1) are there
alternatives other than a total ban on commercial speech; (2) is the
restriction medium-neutral; (3) do similar products face similar
restrictions; (4) what locality created the law; (5) is the range of speech
restricted or banned; and (6) is enforcement of other laws impractical.
The existence of other alternatives to a total ban on commercial
speech is an important factor in assessing the fit between the ends and
the means of a restriction on commercial speech. For example, the
taxation of a particular product may be a more reasonable and effective
alternative to reduce the harm caused by that product.
Additionally, the existence of medium-specific laws should be taken
into account.237 If the government prohibits advertising in one medium,
but permits it in another, there must be a justification for this
discrepancy. If the alleged harm is truly pervasive, then it should be
presumed that the government’s restriction must uniformly ban all
forms of speech concerning that product to be effective. Further,
See supra Part III.A.1 (describing Central Hudson’s material degree standard).
See supra Part III.B (explaining that the Court has historically flip-flopped on the
standard governing the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test and that the Supreme Court
has heard very few commercial speech cases since it instituted the reasonable fit test a
decade ago).
237
See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing that a pitfall of the reasonable fit standard is that it
currently gives the government too much discretion to pick and choose what mediums to
regulate).
235
236
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medium-neutral laws eliminate divisiveness among mediums and allow
the government to appear unbiased.
A significant factor in deciding if there is a reasonable fit is uniform
speech rights for similar products. If the government’s interest in
banning a substance is to limit the effects of its consumption, then the
government ought to impose uniform regulations on all manufacturers
of similar products.238 This principle promotes fairness throughout
industries and bolsters the effect of the government’s action.
Furthermore, the locality of the jurisdiction implementing the law
should be a factor in assessing whether the restriction on commercial
speech is a reasonable fit. This approach would require courts to look at
the history and tradition of each state’s legislature regarding commercial
speech. It would also require courts to account for the norms of each
jurisdiction.
The range of speech being restricted is also a critical factor in
assessing whether the government’s constraint is a proper fit. A court
should examine questions such as: (1) where the speech is restricted; (2)
how the speech is restricted; and (3) to what extent product information
can still enter the market.239 For example, a court may find that banning
solicitation, but permitting advertising, is sufficient to advance the
government’s interest.
Lastly, courts should inquire into whether the enforcement of other
laws is possible, rather than restricting speech. The policing of other
laws, aimed at consumers, could decrease a particular societal harm just
as effectively. In this case, the legislature should focus on regulating
these laws, rather than punishing advertisers because consumers abuse
their products.
D. The Newly Proposed Test Applied in Swecker and Pitt News
If this newly proposed test is applied in Pitt News and Swecker, both
cases would undoubtedly fail Central Hudson’s third prong. In Pitt News,
the government would not be able to prove that alcohol advertisements
would mitigate the consumption of alcohol by underage students to a
material degree.240 Likewise, in Swecker, evidence showed that alcohol
238
See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487–90 (1995) (arguing that the
federal policy banning alcohol manufacturers from printing the alcohol content on malt
beverage containers, but not on wine or spirit containers, was illogical because wine and
spirits have a greater alcohol percentage, and thus present a greater danger to the public).
239
See supra text accompanying notes 181–83 (describing the least restrictive means test).
240
See Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the law banning
alcohol advertisements in college newspapers provided ineffective and remote support for
the government’s purposes).
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consumption on the state university campuses had increased even after
the law had been enacted.241
Moreover, the government would likely not be able to show a
reasonable fit under the proposed factors test in Swecker or Pitt News. In
both cases, there were alternatives to banning alcohol advertisements in
college newspapers; most notably, the greater enforcement of underage
drinking laws. Further, both cases involved medium-specific laws.242
Alcohol advertisements were banned in school newspapers, but not on
the television channels that played on dorm-room TVs.243 Lastly, the
states did not attempt to ban advertising for similar products such as
tobacco, contraceptives, or prescription medication in college
newspapers—all equally obtainable by young people. Therefore, these
laws were severely under-inclusive.
V. CONCLUSION
Without any guidance from the Supreme Court on how to interpret
the third prong of the Central Hudson test, the split in the circuit courts
will surely grow.
Further, multiple standards concerning the
commercial speech doctrine will diminish the legitimacy of the First
Amendment. Concrete and predictable rules are essential if the rights
listed in the Constitution can flourish and be enjoyed by all. By
instituting the material degree standard on a uniform basis, courts can
guarantee that advertisers understand the laws that govern their actions
and consumers will be delivered only reliable, safe, and necessary
commercial messages.
Moreover, by adopting the set of proposed fourth-prong factors in
this Note, the Court can shift from a case-by-case analysis to a more
unified body of commercial speech case law. More importantly, by
analyzing a set of predetermined factors, the integrity of court decisions
will improve because judgments will be viewed as founded in law, not
in judicial discretion.
When the government impedes on intimate things, such as the right
to receive and convey ideas, there ought to be a universal rule applied to

241
See Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 593–94 n.5 (4th Cir. 2010) (Moon, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the government had conceded that drinking on college campuses
had increased after the law banning alcohol advertisements in college newspapers was
passed).
242
See 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-498(e)(5) (1996) (prohibiting alcohol advertisements in
any booklet, program book, yearbook, magazine, newspaper, or other publication of any
educational institution); 3 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-40 (2010) (prohibiting alcoholic
beverage advertisements “in college student publications”) (as amended).
243
Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 107.
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all. Surely, if the Court does not soon address the current Central Hudson
analysis, unjust case-by-case adjudications will thwart the progress of
the commercial speech doctrine and ultimately lead to its demise. In the
meantime, small newspapers and media outlets like the Pitt News,
Cavalier Daily, and Collegiate Times will be forced to cut sections and
perhaps even close. As a result, the vital information, both political and
commercial, disseminated by these small, low-budget media sources will
cease to flow to the public.
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